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“TO REMAND, OR NOT TO REMAND”:
VENTURA’S ORDINARY REMAND RULE AND THE
EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE OF FUTILITY
Patrick J. Glen*
INTRODUCTION
Presumably few federal appellate judges are confronted with
the Danish prince’s existential angst: “To be, or not to be: that is the
question. . . .”1  Nonetheless, a similar ambivalence may be present in
the circumstance of judicial review of administrative agency decisions.
No less eminent an authority than former Second Circuit Judge Henry
Friendly expressed just such angst in the introduction to his 1969
Duke Law Journal article, in which he attempted to discern bright-line
rules in the Supreme Court’s 1943 SEC v. Chenery2 decision: “Al-
though when I began my labors, I had the hope of discovering a bright
shaft of light that would furnish a sure guide to decision in every case,
the grail has eluded me; indeed I have come to doubt that it exists.3
Determination when to reverse and remand a decision that an admin-
istrative agency had power to make, and sufficient evidence to sup-
port, is, I fear, perhaps more art than science.”4  The nature and scope
of judicial review of administrative decisions has taken on increasing
importance as the size of the administrative state has grown and the
number of administrative adjudicators has multiplied.  As one com-
mentator has noted, “[j]udicial review of administrative agency deci-
sions is one of the cornerstones of the modern administrative law
system[,] . . . although the nature and scope of judicial review, and the
authority of the courts to dispose of these matters reflect a variety of
approaches. . . .”5  To a large degree, the question of whether and in
what circumstances remand to the agency rather than a judicial deci-
sion in the first instance is required is still resolved with at least su-
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of justice.
The views and opinions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Department of Justice or the United States government.
1 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
2 SEC v. Cenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
3 Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of
Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 199-200 (1969).
4 Id.
5 Howard N. Fenton, Return to Sender: The Remand Puzzle in Ohio Administra-
tive Law, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 395, 395 (2003).
1
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perficial reference to the Supreme Court’s Chenery decision.  In that
decision, the Court laid out the basic precepts of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action.  “If the action rests upon an administrative deter-
mination—an exercise of judgment in an area which Congress has
entrusted to the agency—of course it must not be set aside because the
reviewing court might have made a different determination were it
empowered to do so.”6  However, “if the action is based upon a determi-
nation of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does
come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived
the law.”7  Thus, the Court gave voice to what would become the
courts’ deferential stance to agency factual findings and discretionary
determinations, and its continuing authority to review legal and con-
stitutional claims de novo.
In the years since Chenery, the Supreme Court has increas-
ingly canonized the deference owed to administrative agencies in the
discharge of their mandates, even as regards the resolution of legal
issues.  An administrative agency’s interpretation of ambiguous provi-
sions in the statute or statutes it is charged with administering is enti-
tled to definitive deference on review so long as it is a reasonable and
permissible construction of the statute.8  Moreover, if the statutory
“gap,” i.e., ambiguity, is the result of an express delegation to the
agency by Congress of the authority to render a definitive interpreta-
tion, that interpretation is conclusive unless “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”9  The Supreme Court has also re-
cently made clear that deference to the agency under Chevron must be
granted even if the agency’s interpretation is contrary to prior judicial
resolutions of the issue: “A court’s prior judicial construction of a stat-
ute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron def-
erence only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and leaves no room
for agency discretion.”10  Likewise, the agency’s construction and in-
terpretation of its regulations is also entitled to substantial deference
on review so long as that interpretation is reasonable.11  Accordingly,
the determinations of administrative agencies as a general matter en-
6 Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94.
7 Id.
8 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.  Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
9 Id.
10 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
11 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 459 (1997); INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’
Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
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joy substantial deference on review, both as to factual and legal
matters.
The deference owed administrative decisions in general is, if
anything, heightened in the context of immigration law on account of
the nature and implications of the decisions being made.  As the Su-
preme Court has noted, “judicial deference to the Executive Branch is
especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials ‘exer-
cise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of
foreign relations.’”12  Decisions by the Attorney General and his dele-
gates in the field of immigration “may affect our relations with . . .
[another] country or its neighbors.  The judiciary is not well positioned
to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and im-
portance of such diplomatic repercussions.”13
The issue presented by this article does not address deference
to agency action as a general matter, but rather confronts a specific
corollary of that principle: decisions entrusted to the agency must be
made by the agency in the first instance prior to resolution by the
courts of appeals.  Accordingly, if a decision must turn on a determina-
tion that the agency for some reason has not yet made, the courts of
appeals should generally remand the matter for determination by the
agency in the first instance rather than resolving that issue de novo
during the appellate process.  Additionally, if there are errors in the
agency decision at issue, whether factual or legal, proceedings should
be remanded by the appellate court after identification of the errors, so
that the agency may reconsider the claims anew without the prior
flaws in its reasoning or rationale.  This general rule pertaining to re-
mand was enunciated in the administrative context in the Chenery de-
cision, and given specific weight in the immigration context by the
Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in INS v. Ventura.14  Nonetheless,
since the Supreme Court’s Ventura decision a line of jurisprudence has
evolved in the immigration context concerning whether remand would
12 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94, 110 (1988)); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.11 (1998)
(“Deference to the political branches dictates ‘a narrow standard of review of deci-
sions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and natu-
ralization.’” (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976)); Abudu, 485 U.S. at
110 (“although all adjudications by administrative agencies are to some degree
judicial and to some degree political and therefore an abuse-of-discretion standard
will often apply to agency adjudications not governed by specific statutory com-
mands—INS officials must exercise especially sensitive political functions that im-
plicate questions of foreign relations, and therefore the reasons for giving
deference to agency decisions on petitions for reopening or reconsideration in other
administrative contexts apply with even greater force in the INS context.”).
13 Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425.
14 INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam).
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be futile and thus the court should dispose of the relevant issue in the
first instance, despite the fact that the agency has not rendered a deci-
sion as an initial matter, or has not been provided with the opportu-
nity to render a decision free of any errors identified by the court on
review.  The purpose of the instant article is to assess the legitimacy of
this evolving jurisprudence in light of general administrative law prin-
ciples governing remand to agency adjudicators and the Supreme
Court’s iteration of the “ordinary remand rule” in the Ventura line of
cases.15
Section I of this article will address the issue of remands from
an administrative law perspective, tracing the development of the
rules for judicial review from the Supreme Court’s Chenery decision,
through that Court’s subsequent clarifications of the “rule” of Chenery,
up to current circuit court practice concerning when remand is neces-
sary and when the court can resolve the issue without the delay of
remand.  This section will also explore circuit court practice pre-Ven-
tura regarding when petitions for review of Board of Immigration Ap-
peals’ decisions should be remanded and when the court could grant or
deny the petition notwithstanding flaws in the underlying agency deci-
sion.  Section II will address the Supreme Court’s line of cases enunci-
ating and clarifying the “ordinary remand rule,” from Ventura,
through Gonzales v. Thomas,16 and culminating in the recent decision
in Negusie v. Holder.17  The evolving circuit court jurisprudence of the
futility of remand is the focus of Section III, with special emphasis on
the case law of the Second Circuit, which has the most developed line
of precedent on this issue.  Nonetheless, in addition to the Second Cir-
cuit, cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits will also be analyzed, as each has at least one case
confronting the question of whether remand for further proceedings
would be futile.  Finally, Section IV seeks to answer the potentially
complicated question of whether this jurisprudence of futility is in ten-
sion with, or complementary to, the Supreme Court’s “ordinary re-
mand rule.”  Although this enterprise may itself be futile, in light of
Judge Friendly’s assertion that the decision to remand is more akin to
art than science, at the very least this article aims to discern the broad
“scientific” rules within which the ultimate, artful decision to remand
may take place.
I. REMAND IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The instant section proceeds in two subsections.  The first will
address the administrative law principles governing remands as a gen-
15 Id. at 17.
16 Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam).
17 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
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eral matter, i.e., what rules courts of appeals should follow on review
regarding when to dispose of issues in the first instance, and when to
return matters to the administrative agency for further proceedings.
The second subsection addresses the specific practice of the courts of
appeals in immigration law, pre-Ventura, regarding when to grant or
deny a petition for review regardless of errors in the agency decision,
and when the matter should be remanded to the Board for further con-
sideration in light of the noted errors.
A. Elucidating the Rule of Chenery
The typical avenue for obtaining judicial review of an agency
action or decision is by filing a petition for review in the appropriate
federal court of appeals.18  The court will then either grant or deny the
petition.  “In most cases, successful prosecution of a [petition for] re-
view . . .  yields . . .  a judicial decision setting aside the agency action
and remanding the proceeding for further agency action not inconsis-
tent with the decision of the reviewing court.”19  This presumption of
remand is based on the agency’s primacy in investigating matters
within its competency and rendering a decision on those issues in the
first instance, and in the fact that the courts of appeals are “not gener-
ally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being re-
viewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.”20
It is, however, simply a presumption, and the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that there will be “rare circumstances” where a remand to the
agency for further proceedings is not necessary.21
What constitutes “rare circumstances” excusing the court from
remanding a matter to the agency?  Such circumstances may arise “if
the legal issue presented admits of only one possible outcome or if the
agency has committed an error of law.”22  In a slightly different con-
struction, “[a] reviewing court can order an agency to provide the relief
it denied only in the unusual case where the court concludes that the
underlying law and facts are such that the agency has no discretion to
18 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 242; 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)
(detailing the requirements for obtaining judicial review of a final order of
removal).
19 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.1  (5th ed. 2010).
20 Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
21 See, e.g., Lorion, 470 U.S. at 744 (“If the record before the agency does not sup-
port the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if
the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the
basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to
remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”) (emphasis
added).
22 Toni M. Fine, Agency Requests for “Voluntary” Remand: A Proposal for the De-
velopment of Judicial Standards, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1079, 1105 (1996).
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act in any other manner, and then only when the court concludes that
a remand to the agency would produce substantial injustice in the
form of further delay of the action to which the petitioner is clearly
entitled.”23  Or, finally, in the simple words of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “[o]n occasion . . . we
find a remand would be futile on certain matters as only one disposi-
tion is possible as a matter of law.  In such cases, we retain and decide
the issue.”24  It is worth noting, however, that even in those “rare cir-
cumstances” when remand may be dispensed with, there is no rule
that compels dispensing with remand and deciding the issue in the
first instance.  Rather, “[i]n such cases, the court may correct the
agency’s legal error and remand for agency compliance or may dis-
pense altogether with a remand and order a final disposition.”25  The
question of whether to actually remand or not is largely dependent on
prudential or pragmatic considerations once the court concludes the
situation presented falls within the scope of the “rare circumstances”
exception.
The dividing line between situations where a remand is re-
quired and those in which a remand may be foregone is somewhat
mythic in actuality, as there are no clear tests to be applied across the
range of administrative cases in which judicial review may be sought.
The existence of such a line, however, is traceable to the Supreme
Court’s Chenery decision, notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme
Court and federal appellate courts have been “modifying” the place-
ment of that line over the better part of the past six decades.  In Che-
nery, the Supreme Court was called upon to review an order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission which was based in large part
on the Commission’s reading of the law of equity.26  The Supreme
Court determined that the order could not be sustained, as the Com-
mission’s basis for that order was not firmly grounded in existing prin-
ciples of equity, but rather on interpretations that would represent an
advancement in that area of law as then understood.27  In vacating the
order and remanding proceedings to the Commission, the Supreme
Court declined to offer any views as to what order the Commission
23 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.1  (5th ed. 2010)
(citing Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.
1994); Cissell Mfg.Co. v. Dep’t of Labor, 101 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 1996); Ward v.
Brown, 22 F.3d 516, 522-23 (2d Cir. 1994)).
24 George Hyman Const. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see
also Wilkett v. ICC, 710 F.2d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“As the finding of unfitness
is clearly in error, the Commission is directed to issue the authority requested.”).
25 Fine, supra note 22, at 1105.
26 SEC v. Cenery, 318 U.S. 80, 89 (1943).
27 Id. at 94.
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could adopt upon remand, once it freed itself of the errors the Court
had identified:
In finding that the Commission’s order cannot be sus-
tained, we are not imposing any trammels on its powers.
We are not enforcing formal requirements.  We are not
suggesting that the Commission must justify its exercise
of administrative discretion in any particular manner or
with artistic refinement.  We are not sticking in the bark
of words.  We merely hold that an administrative order
cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the
agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon
which its action can be sustained.28
The Court thus gave voice to the first great iteration of administrative
primacy within the scope of its mandate:
If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make
and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be
made to do service for an administrative judgment.  For
purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders,
an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain
which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an adminis-
trative agency.29
On remand, the Commission’s substantive order remained the
same, but its reasoning was, on appeal, upheld as permissible, freed as
it was from the prior reliance on its interpretation of equitable princi-
ples.30  Although the prior reasoning of the Commission was not suffi-
cient to sustain its order, its subsequent rationale was and, as the sole
flaw in the initial order was its reliance on impermissible bases, the
“new” order was sustainable even though it was substantively identi-
cal to the prior, vacated order.  In its second Chenery decision, the
Court distilled the main import of its prior decision:
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple
but fundamental rule of administrative law.  That rule is
to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a de-
termination or judgment which an administrative
agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the pro-
priety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the
agency.  If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the
court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by
substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or
28 Id. at 95.
29 Id. at 88.
30 SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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proper basis.  To do so would propel the court into the
domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the
administrative agency.31
The “remand rule” of the Chenery cases seems absolute in scope.  If the
agency has not yet rendered a decision on the relevant issue, or has
committed an error in reaching its disposition, a reviewing court can-
not affirm or deny the appeal and must remand for an agency decision
in the first instance, or an agency decision freed of the underlying er-
ror.32  Even if the rule could have been stated in such absolutist terms
at some point in the distant past, subsequent practice by the Supreme
Court and the federal courts of appeals have eroded its universalist
pretensions.
In a 1964 case, it was contended that the Maritime Commis-
sion had failed to adequately note or ground its statutory authority for
enacting its profit-sharing arrangement of vessel rentals pursuant to
the Merchant Ship Sales Act.33  The Supreme Court held that the
question of what statutory provision the Commission assumed its rele-
vant authority was vested in was irrelevant to its ultimate decision to
enact the agreement and thus, even assuming there was error in the
Commission’s stated basis of authority in entering into the disputed
contract, that error would not have altered the agreed upon resolu-
tion.34  To so hold, however, the Court had to explicitly confront the
contention that Chenery dictated a remand so that the Commission
could clarify its motivation in enacting the agreement.  The Court dis-
agreed that remand was warranted or necessary in light of its conclu-
sion that even assuming error, that error did not impact the substance
of the decision reached:
[W]e find inapposite here cases refusing to validate an
exercise of administrative discretion because it could
have been supported by principles or facts not consid-
ered, or procedures not undertaken, by the responsible
body.  These cases are aimed at assuring that initial ad-
ministrative determinations are made with relevant cri-
teria in mind and in a proper procedural manner; when a
mistake of the administrative body is one that clearly
had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of
the decision reached, as in this instance . . . , the sought
31 Id. at 196.
32 Id.
33 Mass. Tr. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 241 (1964).
34 Id. at 246-47.
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extension of the cases cited [including Chenery] would
not advance the purpose they were intended to serve.35
Five years later, and over the dissent of four justices on the remand
issue, the Supreme Court declined to remand a case to the National
Labor Relations Board for further proceedings, concluding that such a
remand would be futile in light of the Court’s conclusion that the
Board would undoubtedly reach the same disposition even assuming
error in its underlying decision then on review.36  The Court again
took aim at Chenery and the argument that remand was required once
any error was discerned in the administrative action at issue:
To remand would be an idle and useless formality.  Che-
nery does not require that we convert judicial review of
agency action into a ping-pong game.  In Chenery, the
Commission had applied the wrong standards to the ad-
judication of a complex factual situation, and the Court
held that it would not undertake to decide whether the
Commission’s result might have been justified on some
other basis.  Here, by contrast, the substance of the
Board’s command is not seriously contestable.  There is
not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a pro-
ceeding before the Board, whether the Board acted
through a rule or an order.  It would be meaningless to
remand.37
Despite these subsequent clarifications of Chenery, its fundamental
premise remains sound, as the Supreme Court made clear just three
terms ago in National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife.38  In a decision by the Ninth Circuit, the court concluded that
an action taken by the Environmental Protection Agency was arbi-
trary and capricious, recognized that remand was the generally re-
quired course of action in such circumstances, but then went on to
review the statutory scheme at issue and render a definitive interpre-
tation of that statute in the first instance.39  Rehearing en banc was
denied over the dissent of six judges, who argued that if the EPA’s
analysis was indeed faulty, then the proper course of action was re-
mand, not a judgment by the Ninth Circuit in the first instance re-
35 Id. at 247-48.  For an explication of this decision, see Friendly, supra note 3, at
210-11.
36 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); see generally The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, Prospective Rulings in Agency Adjudication, 83 HARV. L. REV.
220 (1969).
37 Wyman-Gordon, Co., 394 U.S. at 766 n.6.
38 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 684 (2007).
39 Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
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garding a statute that the EPA was charged with administering.40
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on the merits, deter-
mining that the EPA’s construction of the statute was reasonable and
permissible, and chastised the court for overstepping its authority in
its review of the agency’s order:
[T]he court below expressly recognized that [its] finding
required it to “remand to the agency for a plausible ex-
planation of its decision, based on a singly, coherent in-
terpretation of the statute.”  But the Ninth Circuit did
not take this course; instead, it jumped ahead to resolve
the merits of the dispute.  In so doing, it erroneously de-
prived the agency of its usual administrative avenue for
explaining and reconciling the arguably contradictory ra-
tionales that sometimes appear in the course of lengthy
and complex administrative decisions.41
In the end, is there a coherent set of principles embodied by the
Chenery line of cases?  Judge Friendly extracted three basic rules in
his exposition of the cases as they stood in 1969.42  First, “even when
an agency has acted on an admissible construction of the statute and
has made sufficient factual findings, a reviewing court may still re-
verse and remand if the agency has not adequately explained why it
chose to do what it did.”43  Second, “[w]here the agency has rested deci-
sion on an unsustainable reason, the court should generally reverse
and remand even though it discerns a possibility, even a strong one,
that by another course of reasoning the agency might come to the same
result.”44  Third, reversal and remand is required where there are in-
adequate or erroneous findings.45  Nonetheless, regarding Friendly’s
last rule, “reversal and remand are [not] required each and every time
an administrative agency assigns a wrong reason for its action; rather,
it requires reversal and remand only where there is a significant
chance that but for the error, the agency might have reached a differ-
40 Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 396-97 (9th Cir. 2006).
41 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 657-58.
42 Friendly, supra note 3, at 222.
43 Id.
44 Id.; cf. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(noting that remand is required to permit an agency to exercise its primacy in
statutory interpretation when an agency discerns no ambiguity in statutory lan-
guage, rests it relevant decision on that basis, but the court concludes that there is
an ambiguity in need of resolution) (citing Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. ICC, 826 F.2d
1125, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
45 Friendly, supra note 3, at 223.
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ent result.”46  Thus, the presumption of remand stands unchanged in
2010, but it is as clear as ever that this is a rebuttable presumption
which may be overcome in the right circumstances.
B. Remands in Immigration Law Pre-Ventura
This subsection addresses the practice of the federal courts of
appeals, pre-Ventura, in exercising their discretion to hold and decide
a case, consistent with the Chenery line of decisions, notwithstanding
the existence of errors in the underlying administrative order.  These
decisions can be largely grouped into three illustrative, though not ex-
haustive categories.
First, the courts generally declined to remand matters to the
agency where errors were present in the agency’s determination of an
alien’s statutory eligibility for discretionary relief, but where the
agency also decided, or made clear it would decide, that such relief
would not be granted in the exercise of its discretion regardless of tech-
nical eligibility.47  Thus, in Dhine v. Slattery, the Second Circuit de-
clined to remand a petition to the Board for further proceedings
despite potential errors in the agency’s findings with respect to the
alien’s fear of persecution if removed, because the agency had also de-
termined that asylum would be denied in the exercise of its discretion,
thus rendering any errors in the eligibility determination irrelevant to
the ultimate disposition.48  That court similarly denied remand in Hib-
bert v. INS on the ground that voluntary departure would be denied in
the exercise of discretion, rendering futile any further proceedings to
determine the alien’s technical statutory eligibility for that form of dis-
cretionary relief.49  In a more recent case from the First Circuit, how-
ever, that court determined that a remand was necessary, as there was
error in the agency’s determination regarding the alien’s eligibility for
asylum, and there was no clear indication that such relief would be
denied in the exercise of discretion if the alien was found to be statuto-
rily eligible.50
The second category of cases concerns those situations akin to
harmless error analysis; i.e., the court determines that no remand is
46 NLRB v. Am. Geri-Care, Inc., 697 F.2d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon, Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969)); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Richard-
son, 434 F.2d 536, 547 n.21 (2d Cir. 1970).
47 To a large extent, this rationale is embodied in the Supreme Court’s decision in
INS v. Bagamasbad, where the Court held that an agency need decide only those
arguments that are necessary in order for it to dispose of the issues presented. 429
U.S. 24 (1976),
48 Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1993).
49 Hibbert v. INS, 554 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1977).
50 Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1993).
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\RGL101.txt unknown Seq: 12  2-DEC-10 14:58
12 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:1
warranted because there has been no showing that, but for the pur-
ported error, the proceedings may have come out differently.  The
Ninth Circuit denied remand in Tejeda-Mata v. INS on this ground,
holding that, although the immigration judge did abuse his discretion
in not allowing simultaneous translation of the alien’s removal pro-
ceedings, it was clear that this error did not have any deleterious effect
on the outcome of the proceeding and thus the result would not change
if the case was remanded and this error remedied.51  Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit denied remand in Dobrota v. INS despite finding error
in the agency’s consideration of the alien’s claim of past persecution in
Romania, because the subsequent change in country conditions in
Romania made clear that the alien would not possess an objectively
reasonable well-founded fear of persecution if removed.52
Finally, remand has been denied in circumstances where the
court determines that there is but one conclusion that the agency could
reach on remand, even if the agency did not reach the issue found dis-
positive by the court.  In Navas v. INS, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
agency’s determination that an applicant failed to establish past per-
secution, but did not remand for a determination of whether changed
country conditions could rebut the presumption of future persecution,
because the court found the record clearly indicated the well-founded
fear of persecution could not be rebutted.53  The First Circuit granted a
petition for review in Fergiste v. INS on this same basis.54  Judge Selya
dissented in part from that disposition, arguing that remand was the
appropriate remedy to ensure the burden of proof for establishing or
rebutting a well-founded fear of persecution was correctly allocated,
and to permit consideration of all relevant evidence regarding whether
any presumption of persecution could be rebutted.55  The bulk of cases
falling into this category are those in which the courts have found
some error in the agency’s determination regarding eligibility for asy-
lum or other discretionary relief, held that the alien is in fact eligible
when those errors are purged, and remanded solely to permit the At-
torney General to exercise his discretion in granting or denying that
relief.56
This review may indicate that the courts were all too willing to
decide, in the first instance, issues delegated to the agency.  That is
51 Tejada-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1980).
52 Dobrota v. INS, 195 F.3d 970, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1999).
53 Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 657-58  (9th Cir. 2000).
54 Fergiste v. INS, 138 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 1998).
55 Id. at 21-22 (Selya, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“To be sure, in
some cases the record may be so pellucid that remand would be an empty exercise.
But, I see no indication that this is such a case.”).
56 See Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2000); Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d
1375 (9th Cir. 1990); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
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not entirely accurate.  The courts’ disposition of these immigration
cases is consistent with their disposition of other administrative law
issues.  Remand is the presumption, but that presumption may be
overcome.  Nonetheless, at least in light of the subsequent Supreme
Court decisions addressing the application of the “ordinary remand
rule” in the immigration context, the courts presumed, or arrogated,
authority was broader pre-Ventura than it is on any fair reading of
Ventura and its progeny.  Those cases are the subject of the next
section.
II. INS V. VENTURA, GONZALES V. THOMAS, AND NEGUSIE
V. HOLDER: THE “ORDINARY REMAND RULE” IN
IMMIGRATION LAW
Orlando Ventura, a native and citizen of Guatemala, fled that
country after allegedly receiving numerous threats from the guerrillas
that he should either join them or face the consequences.57  Ventura
purportedly had family members who were serving or had served in
the Guatemalan military, and he alleged that the guerrillas perceived
him to be their enemy on this account.58  After hearing his claims, an
immigration judge determined that he failed to establish eligibility for
asylum or withholding of removal, as he could not establish that any
persecution alleged or feared was on account of one of the five enumer-
ated statutory grounds of protection.59  Additionally, the immigration
judge found no reasonable fear of persecution “[i]n view of changing
country conditions” in Guatemala.60  Ventura appealed to the Board,
but his appeal was dismissed.  The Board based its decision solely on
Ventura’s failure to demonstrate that the persecution alleged or feared
was on account of a statutorily protected ground, and did not reach the
57 Ventura v. INS, 264 F.3d 1150, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2001).
58 Id. at 1153.
59 Id. See INA § 101(a)(42), § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (an applicant for asylum and
withholding of removal must establish persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion); INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. §1158 (2006) (standard and bur-
den of proof for establishing eligibility for asylum); INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (2006) (standard and burden of proof for establishing eligibility for
withholding of removal).
60 Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1153.  An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal
who establishes past persecution is entitled to a presumption of a well-founded
and clear probability of persecution if removed. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1),
1208.16(b)(1)(i) (2010).  This presumption may be rebutted by establishing, inter
alia, a change in country conditions in the applicant’s native country such that
there is no longer an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A) (2010).
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issue of whether changed country conditions in Guatemala would un-
dercut any claim of future persecution.61
Ventura filed a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit,
which granted the petition.  That court held that Ventura did establish
that the persecution alleged was on account of a statutorily protected
ground, specifically, an imputed political opinion.62  As the court held
Ventura established past persecution, it determined that he was enti-
tled to the regulatory presumption of a fear of persecution if he was
removed.63  Although the Board did not reach the issue of whether the
government could rebut this presumption, and thus there was no
agency finding on that issue before the court, the Ninth Circuit none-
theless held that remand was not warranted: “We do not remand . . .
when it is clear that we would be compelled to reverse the BIA’s deci-
sion if the BIA decided the matter against the applicant.”64  On the
record before it, the court concluded that “remand in this case is inap-
propriate because the INS’s evidence of changed country conditions
clearly demonstrates that the presumption of a well-founded fear of
persecution was not rebutted.”65  In support of this proposition, the
court cited to the State Department Country Reports which indicated
continuing levels of political tension and violence in Guatemala.66
Thus, the court determined Ventura was statutorily eligible for with-
holding of removal and asylum based on the unrebutted presumption
of future persecution, granted his application for withholding of re-
moval, as that form of protection is mandatory once statutory eligibil-
ity has been established, and remanded proceedings to the Board for
the sole purpose of permitting the agency to exercise its discretion in
granting or denying the application for asylum.67
The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and,
without further briefing or argument, the Supreme Court granted the
61 Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1153.
62 See id. at 1154-57.
63 Id. at 1157; see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (2010).
64 Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1157.
65 Id. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A) (2010).
66 Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1157-58.
67 Id. at 1158; see INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (“The . . . Attorney
General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum.”) (emphasis
added); INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s
life of freedom would be threatened in that country.”) (emphasis added); see also
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 420 (“[W]hereas withholding is mandatory unless the
Attorney General determines one of the exceptions applies, the decision whether
asylum should be granted to an eligible alien is committed to the Attorney Gen-
eral’s discretion.”) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428-29, n.6
(1987)).
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petition and summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit on the ground that
its determination of an issue, without prior resolution by the adminis-
trative agency in the first instance, was in excess of its legal authority
as a reviewing court.68  The Supreme Court noted that the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act entrusts to the agency the decision of whether
or not an alien is eligible for asylum, and thus the agency has primacy
in resolving that issue.69  If the agency has not reached the relevant
issue in the course of the administrative proceedings, and the review-
ing court determines that resolution of that issue is necessary to the
ultimate disposition of the petitioner’s case, then “the proper course,
except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
investigation or explanation.”70  The Court further clarified the reach
and rationale behind the ordinary remand rule, as well as its specific
importance in the context of immigration law:
Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a
case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes
place primarily in agency hands.  This principle has obvi-
ous importance in the immigration context.  The BIA has
not yet considered the ‘changed circumstances’ issue.
And every consideration that classically supports the
law’s ordinary remand requirement does so here.  The
agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it
can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial deter-
mination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed dis-
cussion and analysis, help a court later determine
whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law
provides.71
Applying those considerations to the decision on review, the Court had
little trouble in concluding that the “Court of Appeals committed clear
error here.  It seriously disregarded the agency’s legally mandated
role. . . .  And it did so without giving the BIA the opportunity to ad-
dress the matter in the first instance in light of its own experience.”72
Accordingly, insofar as the Ninth Circuit had reached and decided the
issue of changed country conditions, its decision was reversed and pro-
ceedings remanded so that the Ninth Circuit could in turn remand
proceedings to the Board.
In the wake of Ventura, two other Ninth Circuit cases then
pending before the Supreme Court were summarily reversed and re-
68 Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16.
69 Id. at 16.
70 Id. (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
71 Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16-17.
72 Id. at 17.
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manded with instructions to the court to apply the rule of Ventura.73
In Silva-Jacinto v. INS, the court held, in the first instance, that the
persecution alleged by the alien was on account of a statutorily pro-
tected ground.74  Judge Noonan dissented on the ground that such a
determination must be made by the agency in the first instance, prior
to review by an appellate court.75  As no agency decision had been
made, remand was required.76  The extent of the Ninth Circuit’s error
in Chen v. INS was broader than either Silva-Jacinto or Ventura it-
self.77  In that case, the agency held that a Chinese alien could not
establish his eligibility for asylum because he was not credible, and
thus did not reach the merits of the application for relief.78  The court
reversed the credibility determination, and then went on to hold that
the applicant established his eligibility for asylum and withholding of
removal on the merits.79  The court justified this abrogation of admin-
istrative primacy on the ground that “we generally ‘do not remand a
matter to the BIA if, on the record before us, it is clear that we would
be compelled to reverse its decision if it had decided the matter against
the applicant.’. . . [A] review of the complete administrative record
before us allows us to properly evaluate Chen’s claim for relief.”80
Four years later, the Supreme Court was required to revisit its
decision in Ventura, in a case again arising from the Ninth Circuit.
Michelle Thomas and members of her family, all white South Africans,
applied for asylum in the United States.81  Both the Board and an im-
migration judge denied their applications, holding that any harm al-
leged or feared was not shown to be on account of a statutorily
protected ground, specifically, race or political opinion.82  The Ninth
Circuit explicitly noted that the agency did not address the issue of
whether the Thomases could establish eligibility based on their mem-
bership in a particular social group, but nonetheless reversed the
agency on that issue, holding that the petitioners did establish that
the harm alleged was on account of their membership in a particular
social group, their family.83  The court ordered proceedings remanded
to the Board solely for a determination of whether the South African
73 See INS v. Silva-Jacinto, 537 U.S. 1100 (2003) (memorandum); INS v. Yi Quan
Chen, 537 U.S. 1016 (2002) (memorandum).
74 Silva-Jacinto v. INS, 37 F. App’x 302 (9th Cir. 2002).
75 Id. at 304 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
76 Id.
77 Chen v. INS, 266 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2001).
78 Id. at 1101.
79 Id. at 1101.
80 Id.
81 Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2004).
82 Id. at 1173-74.
83 Id. at 1177-79.
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government would be unable or unwilling to protect the Thomases
from their purported third-party persecutors.84  Judge Fernandez dis-
sented from the majority opinion, writing that he would have denied
the petition on its merits, but he did not mention the court’s impropri-
ety in reaching the particular social group issue in the first instance.85
Rehearing en banc was granted, but the ultimate disposition of
the case remained the same.86  On rehearing, the court held that: 1) a
family may constitute a particular social group within the meaning of
the INA; 2) the harm suffered by the Thomas family was on account of
their family, i.e., on account of their membership in a particular social
group, and thus was on account of a statutorily protected ground; and
3) remand was required, pursuant to Ventura, to determine whether
the harm alleged and feared rose to the requisite level of severity to
constitute persecution, as that term is contemplated by the INA.87
Judges Rymer, O’Scannlain, Kleinfeld, and Bea dissented from the en
banc decision.  The dissenters would have remanded the determina-
tion of whether the Thomas family constitutes a particular social
group to the Board consistent with the requirements of Ventura.88
The Ninth Circuit was again summarily reversed, and in une-
quivocal language: “The Ninth Circuit’s failure to remand is legally
erroneous, and that error is ‘obvious in light of Ventura,’ itself a sum-
mary reversal.”89  Having recounted the facts of the Thomas case and
its prior holding in Ventura, the Supreme Court held:
We must reach the same conclusion in the present case.
The agency has not yet considered whether [the alien’s]
family presents the kind of ‘kinship ties’ that constitute a
particular social group.  The matter requires determin-
ing the facts and deciding whether the facts as found fall
within a statutory term. . . .  We can find no special cir-
cumstances here that might have justified the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s determination of the matter in the first instance.
Thus, as in Ventura, the Court of Appeals should have
applied the “ordinary ‘remand’ rule.”90
In the wake of this case, two other petitions raising particular social
group issues were summarily reversed and remanded for proceedings
84 Id. at 1180.
85 See generally id. at 1180 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
86 Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
87 See id. at 1187-89.
88 Id. at 1189-93 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
89 Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006).
90 Id. at 186-87.
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consistent with the Thomas decision.91  In Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales,
the Ninth Circuit determined, consistent with the immigration judge,
that disabled children in Russia constitute a particular social group.92
Remand was required, however, because the Board did not explicitly
address the issue, affirming the immigration judge’s ultimate denial of
the application for asylum on the ground that the harm alleged and
feared did not rise to the level of persecution.93  In Gao v. Gonzales, the
Second Circuit impermissibly determined, in the first instance, that
women sold into marriage contracts constitute a particular social
group.94
Finally, in its October 2008 term, the Supreme Court issued its
latest decision in the Ventura line—Negusie v. Holder.95  Negusie, an
Eritrean, filed a petition for review of the agency’s determination that
he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal on account of
the “persecutor bar.”96  He had worked as a jailer in a prison where the
prisoners were routinely persecuted, but he averred that he did not
participate directly in such acts.97  Noting the Supreme Court’s prior
decision in Fedorenko v. United States,98 as had the agency before it,
the Fifth Circuit deemed irrelevant the question of whether Negusie
was coerced to participate or whether he shared the opinions of his
coworkers.99  On the record before it, the court held that the evidence
did not compel the finding, contrary to that reached by the agency,
that Negusie did not assist in the persecution of prisoners.100
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Fifth Circuit
with instructions to remand to the Board for further proceed-
ings.(insert footnote 94a here).  The Court held that Fedorenko did not
control the outcome of Negusie’s case, as the statutory schemes at is-
sue in the respective cases were distinct in material ways, including in
the purposes and rationales behind their enactment.101  The Board
had rendered its decision under the false assumption that Fedorenko
did control the disposition of the case, and thus had not yet exercised
its authority to interpret the statute in the first instance free of er-
91 See Gonzales v. Tchoukhrova, 549 U.S. 801 (2006) (memorandum); Keisler v.
Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) (memorandum).
92 See Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005).
93 Id.
94 Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006).
95 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
96 Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325 (5th Cir. 2007); see INA
§§ 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 241(b)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i).
97 Negusie, 231 F. App’x at 326.
98 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
99 Negusie, 231 F. App’x at 326.
100 Id.
101 Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1164-66.
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ror;102 remand was required to allow the Board to interpret the scope
and content of the “persecutor bar” provision in the first instance.103
Justifying this outcome, especially in light of a dissent that would have
rendered an interpretation of this provision in the first instance,104 the
Court noted that the “remand rule exists, in part, because ambiguities
in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delega-
tions of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable
fashion.  Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that
agencies are better equipped to make than courts.”105
* * *
As a collection, what should these cases and their statement of
the “ordinary remand rule” be taken to stand for?  Do these cases es-
tablish a bright line rule of the sort Judge Friendly found missing in
Chenery and its progeny?  The appeal to science must fail, as the ques-
tion of remand remains more art than mechanics, but at least three
principles are apparent, largely mirroring those noted by Friendly in
his distillation of Chenery.
First, the “reversal of the agency on a dispositive issue such as
credibility may bring into play issues of eligibility or discretion not yet
addressed by the agency,” necessitating remand for further proceed-
ings.106  Remand would seem to be not only the most appropriate re-
course, but the necessary one in immigration cases, notwithstanding
any “clarity” the court could perceive in the evidence of record.  As
now-Board member John Guendelsberger wrote of Ventura, “[t]he
court . . . reached its determination that remand was required for an
unresolved question of fact independently of any examination of the
strength of the factual record before it. . . .  [Thus, e]ven if the court
regards the evidence of record as so one-sided as to make the result on
remand a foregone conclusion, the court should remand to the agency
rather than proceed to evaluate whether reasonable factfinders could
reach different conclusions based on the evidence.”107  Accordingly, if a
factual issue has not been addressed by the Board in the first instance,
and factual issues in the immigration context include many eligibility
determinations for relief and protection under the INA, the matter
must be remanded notwithstanding the fact that the court perceives
the “correct” resolution of the issue.  This may or may not be the case
102 Id. at 1166-67.
103 Id. at 1167-68.
104 See id. at 1170-76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
105 Id. at 1167 (majority opinion).
106 John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal
Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 635 (2004).
107 Id. at 636.
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when resolution of one issue properly before the court gives rise to a
new purely legal or constitutional claim that has not yet been ad-
dressed by the agency.  There may be instances that fall within the
“rare circumstances” language, but these would have to be addressed
on a case-by-case basis.  It is worth noting that remand would still be
the presumption even if the unresolved issue is legal or constitutional
in character, so long as the Board has jurisdiction to address the issue
on remand.  Reviewing cases in the immediate aftermath of Ventura,
Guendelsberger observed that “[r]ather than decide the issue ahead of
the agency, some courts simply express their view that the respondent
appears to be eligible and remand to permit the agency to make the
decision.  This procedure likely accomplishes the desired result with-
out raising any questions of compliance with the Ventura remand
requirement.”108
Second, remand may be required in circumstances where the
agency has addressed the relevant issue, but where it “committed legal
or factual error in reaching its conclusion.”109 Errors in this category
may require remand, or they may fall within the “rare circumstances”
exception.  For instance, if the agency somehow erred in determining
eligibility for asylum, and the court concludes that the record compels
the conclusion that the alien did establish eligibility for asylum, re-
mand would be required only insofar as the agency would have to
render an ultimate discretionary determination on whether asylum
should be granted.  Harkening back to  pre-Ventura cases, if the
agency committed a legal error in determining eligibility, but other-
wise denied relief in the exercise of discretion and would do so regard-
less of technical statutory eligibility, remand should be foregone as the
agency discretionary decision is determinative notwithstanding the le-
gal errors.  To the contrary, if the agency applies an incorrect legal
standard or otherwise makes a legal error in determining eligibility,
but has expressed no opinion regarding whether relief would be
granted in the exercise of discretion, remand would be the appropriate
course of action.
Finally, “[r]emand for further agency review may also be
needed when a court finds analysis too terse, elliptical, or inadequate
to permit meaningful evaluation of the agency’s reasoning.  In such a
situation, rather than substitute the court’s own analysis or guess at
what the Board’s reasoning must have been,” remand for further clari-
fication is required.110  This assertion is rooted in Chenery’s observa-
tion that agency action can be sustained only on the grounds upon
which the agency itself based its initial decision, and if these grounds
108 Id. at 638.
109 Id. at 635.
110 Id. at 641.
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are unclear, the proceeding must be remanded even if the result the
agency reached appears to be correct or otherwise sustainable.111  In
essence, the agency must be given the opportunity to clarify its ratio-
nale prior to having its action judged on review before the appellate
court.
The Seventh Circuit gave its own exposition of Ventura in its
2004 decision in Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft.112  In its initial panel deci-
sion, the court determined that a finding of persecution was compelled,
and entered an order remanding the case to the Board to enter an or-
der granting the applicant asylum.113  The government petitioned for
panel rehearing, “arguing that [the court’s] decision to remand the
case with instructions to enter an order granting asylum” contravened
Ventura’s ordinary remand rule.114  The government based its argu-
ment on two contentions connected to the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Ventura: 1) “that once an agency error is identified, a court of ap-
peals should remand a case for additional investigation or explana-
tion”; and 2) “appellate courts should not decide issues when an agency
has not considered them.”115  The court disagreed with the govern-
ment’s contention that any error necessitates remand: “[W]e do not
agree that Ventura stands for the broad proposition that a court of ap-
peals must remand a case for additional investigation or explanation
once an error is identified. . . .  We are well-within our authority to
reverse the IJ’s eligibility determination if manifestly contrary to law,
and our decision to do so in no way disregards the agency’s expertise
and role as front-line evaluator of evidence. . . . Moreover, if the record
evidence compels the result that we have reached, then no alternative
determination is possible.”116  The court did, however, agree that its
order directing that asylum be granted overstepped the permissible
bounds of its authority, as that was a decision confined to the Attorney
General’s discretion.117  Accordingly, the petition for rehearing was
granted, and the opinion modified to remove the directive to grant
asylum.
111 SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947); see Friendly, supra note 3, at 222.
112 Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 2004) (order).
113 Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1116, 1120 (7th Cir. 2004).
114 Ghebremedhin, 392 F.3d at 242.
115 Id. at 243.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 244 (“The Attorney General does not contest that Ghebremedhin is stat-
utorily eligible for asylum, but instead argues that the panel essentially exercised
a purely administrative function by remanding with instructions to enter an order
granting asylum.  We agree that the power to grant asylum is vested solely in the
hands of the Attorney General, and that even if an alien is otherwise eligible, the
Attorney General is empowered by statute to deny relief.”).
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\RGL101.txt unknown Seq: 22  2-DEC-10 14:58
22 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:1
In the end, the Ventura line of cases is akin to its Chenery pred-
ecessors, insofar as both drew in broad strokes while vesting consider-
able discretion in the courts of appeals to remand or consider and
decide the issue in the first instance. Ventura explicitly and unequivo-
cally “recognizes the primary role of the Board . . . in interpreting the
immigration law in removal proceedings.  [It] makes clear that the
agency should determine whether the evidence of record meets the rel-
evant legal standards before the court applies the substantial evidence
test to the  record.  Likewise, the courts should permit the agency to
address unresolved issues involving interpretation of the immigration
law before examining whether the Board’s interpretation is within the
leeway permitted” by the governing standards of administrative
law.118  Nonetheless, the decision also
[L]eaves considerable room for disagreement as to when
remand for further agency review is required.  What ap-
pears evident is that the courts retain a large measure of
discretion in determining, on a case by case basis,
whether factual investigation or explanation from the
agency should be requested when there are concerns
with the factual or analytical underpinnings of the
agency decision.119
To what extent the courts of appeals have exercised their dis-
cretion to hold immigration cases rather than remand to the agency,
and whether these dispositions are a legitimate exercise of the appel-
late function or a transgression of the ordinary remand rule, is the
subject of the following section.
III. “FUTILITY OF REMAND” JURISPRUDENCE
POST-VENTURA
Since Ventura was decided in 2002, several courts of appeals
have held that, in situations where remand to the Board for further
proceedings would be futile, the court may decide an issue in the first
instance, notwithstanding the fact that the agency may not have ad-
dressed the issue in its underlying decision, or the agency decision was
somehow erroneous.  In effect, the courts have attempted to develop a
jurisprudence of the “rare circumstances” exception to the ordinary re-
mand rule.  The intent of this section is to explore these decisions,
while the subsequent section will address whether these decisions are
in any meaningful way about the courts’ remand authority and
whether, if these decisions do implicate Ventura, the courts have acted
permissibly in declining to remand.  In the context of “futility jurispru-
118 Guendelsberger, supra note 106, at 649.
119 Id. at 644.
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dence,” the Second Circuit’s line of precedent is by far the most devel-
oped and will be the focus of this section.  Nonetheless, at least seven
other courts of appeals have held that remand to the Board would be
futile in certain circumstances, and those decisions will also be
addressed.
A. Futility in the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit’s futility jurisprudence is largely grounded
in a series of decisions issued in early 2006, addressing agency adverse
credibility determinations.  In Cao He Lin v. U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, the immigration judge, affirmed by the Board, denied a Chinese
alien’s application for asylum based on the determination that the
alien was not credible in the presentation of his claim.120  In reaching
its decision in the case, the Second Circuit undertook an extensive re-
view of its scope of review regarding the circumstances where it would
be required to remand for further proceedings.  Although “serious legal
errors . . . will ordinarily require vacatur and remand for a new assess-
ment of the evidence and/or a new hearing[,] . . . [o]ur cases implicitly
recognize . . . that not every minor error requires a remand.”121  For
instance, the court averred that it would not be required to remand if
it had discerned error in one aspect of the agency decision, but the
agency had also based its decision on a second, independently disposi-
tive, and error free finding.122  Additionally, the court contended that
it was “not required to remand where there is no realistic possibility
that, absent the errors, the IJ or BIA would have reached a different
conclusion.”123  For this proposition, the court relied explicitly on pre-
Ventura case law and Supreme Court precedent, including Chenery,
pertaining to administrative law in general.124  In these cases, the
court found support for at least two principles that “would support af-
firming despite legal error and despite the policy of allowing the ad-
ministrative adjudicator to assess the impact of identified legal error
on its credibility and sufficiency findings. . . .”125  Remand may not be
required if the agency’s “reliance on an erroneous aspect of its reason-
ing is so tangential that there is no realistic possibility that the out-
come would be different on remand.”126  Secondly, the court “believe[d]
that remand should not be required where—notwithstanding admitted
errors—overwhelming evidence supporting the administrative adjudi-
120 Cao He Ling v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005).
121 Id. at 401.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 401-02.
125 Id. at 402.
126 Id.
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cator’s findings makes it clear that the same decision would have been
reached in the absence of the errors.”127  Based on these principles, the
court then established a rough scheme concerning outcomes in differ-
ent situations: 1) the court will “defer to the IJ’s fact-finding and af-
firm when the fact-finding is based on specific and cogent reasons not
infected by legal error,” 2) it will “remand where identified errors leave
[it] in doubt whether the IJ would have reached the same result absent
the errors,” 3) it will “affirm, despite IJ errors, when [it] can confi-
dently predict that the IJ would necessarily reach the same result ab-
sent errors,” and 4) it will “grant the petition only in those extremely
rare instances where substantial evidence does not exist to support the
IJ’s decision.”128  Applying those principles to Cao He Lin’s case, the
Court held “that the erroneous aspects of the IJ’s reasoning are not
tangential to the findings she made and that the evidence supporting
her findings is not so overwhelming that it is clear she would reach the
same results on remand.”129  Thus, remand was necessary.
The Second Circuit revisited this reasoning shortly thereafter
in the case of Xiao Ji Chen, another Chinese asylum seeker.130  The
agency decision at issue was again a credibility determination, as both
the Board and the immigration judge held that Chen failed to credibly
establish his eligibility for relief or protection under the INA.  The Sec-
ond Circuit noted that an agency credibility determination must be
supported by substantial evidence in the record,131 but also wrote that
it “may affirm [such a finding] even when the IJ’s reasoning is defi-
cient in certain respects, provided that despite any errors—considered
in the context of the IJ’s entire analysis—we can state with confidence
that the same decision would be made if we were to remand.”132  Al-
though referring to its prior decision in Cao He Lin and the circum-
stances that panel discerned in which remand to the agency would not
be warranted, the Xiao Ji Chen panel held that, as the ultimate find-
ing and disposition in Cao He Lin was that the agency decision could
not be sustained, thus necessitating a remand, “by also identifying po-
tential circumstances where a remand would not have been required,
[that] panel was of course offering dicta.”133  Accordingly, the decision
127 Id.
128 Id. at 395.
129 Id. at 406.
130 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2006), reh’g granted
on other grounds Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2006)
(all citations are to the opinion issued on rehearing).
131 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(“the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudi-
cator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”).
132 Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 335 (citing Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 401-02).
133 Id. at 338.
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in Cao He Lin did not establish any binding precedent regarding the
circumstances as to when a remand would not be required despite er-
rors in the agency decision.134  Nonetheless, Xiao Ji Chen recognized
that the court in Cao He Lin did ascertain the proper “overarching test
for deeming a remand futile”: “when the reviewing court can ‘confi-
dently predict’ that the agency would reach the same decision absent
the errors that were made.”135  This exercise is fraught with subjectiv-
ity and discretion:
The strength of the error-free portions of an IJ’s ultimate
finding that will permit a panel to state with confidence
that a remand would be futile cannot be precisely quanti-
fied.  Whether the evidence supporting the error-free
findings is characterized as “overwhelming,” “signifi-
cant,” “highly persuasive,” or some other comparable
wording is more a matter of linguistics than law.  If the
reviewing court undertakes to determine whether re-
mand would be futile, it should assess the entire record
and determine whether, based on the strength of the evi-
dence supporting the error-free findings and the signifi-
cance of those findings, it is clear that the agency would
adhere to its decision were the petition remanded.136
Nonetheless, it is within the court’s legitimate authority not only to
remand when that recourse is appropriate, but also to affirm the
agency’s determination “despite error, where that analysis is other-
wise supported by substantial evidence and we can state with confi-
dence that the same decision would be made on remand.”137  In Xiao Ji
Chen’s case, although the immigration judge’s credibility determina-
tion did contain errors, the ultimate finding that the applicant failed to
credibly carry his burdens in establishing eligibility for relief and pro-
tection under the INA was supported by substantial evidence in the
record, negating any need for remand to address the noted errors.138
The court reached the same conclusion in two other cases de-
cided that spring.  In Qyteza v. Gonzales, the court denied a petition for
review where, “notwithstanding our recognition of error in the IJ’s de-
cision, we conclude that the . . . denial of petitioners’ asylum applica-
tion was supported by substantial evidence and, despite error, ‘we can
state with confidence that the IJ would adhere to [her] decision were
134 Id.
135 Id. at 339 (citing Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 395).
136 Id. at 339.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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the petition remanded.’”139  Similarly, in Lin v. Gonzales, the court
held that “[d]espite the errors made by the IJ in this case, the adverse
credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. . . .  As
we have no doubt that the IJ would have reached the same conclusions
without reliance on the erroneous findings, we therefore deny Lin’s pe-
tition for review.”140
The court nonetheless revisited its prior decisions in Cao He
Lin and Xiao Ji Chen in a pair of Calabresi decisions issued at the end
of June 2006, which sought to harmonize the superficially disparate
analysis offered by those cases.141  In Li Hua Lin, the court began its
assessment of futility by noting the deferential compelling evidence
standard pursuant to which the courts of appeals review the agency’s
factual findings under the INA.142  Pursuant to that deferential stan-
dard, “where an IJ’s errors are relatively minor in light of the record as
a whole, the understandable inclination is to assume the errors are
‘harmless’ and deny review, just as we would affirm a district court
judgment tinged with errors that do not affect the ultimate outcome of
the proceeding.”143  Nonetheless, the courts of appeals must also be
“mindful . . .  that ‘a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for
an administrative judgment,’”144 and “[i]t is precisely because fact-
finding in both the asylum and the withholding contexts is expressly
committed to the discretion of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”) that, when those findings rely upon legal errors, the
appropriate remedy is generally to vacate those findings and remand
to the BIA for reconsideration of the applicant’s claim.”145  Although
these requirements do not necessarily impel the court to chart a dan-
gerous path between Scylla and Charybdis, its jurisprudence nonethe-
less “remains on a continuing course of reconciliation between the twin
commands neither to disturb substantially supported factual determi-
nations nor to let stand determinations that rely, in whole or in part,
on legal error.”146
Calabresi recounted the trajectories of the court’s decisions in
Cao He Lin and Xiao Ji Chen, noting the slight or superficial differ-
ences in the approach to the question of remands presented by each
139 Qyteza v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
140 Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2006).
141 Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2006); Li Zu Guan v.
INS, 453 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2006).
142 Li Hua Lin, 453 F.3d at 106 (citing INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)).
143 Id. (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004)).
144 Id. (citing Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)).
145 Id.
146 Id.
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case.147  Taken together, however, the panel harmonized the prior de-
cisions by taking them to establish, jointly, that remand to the Board
would be futile in at least three distinct circumstances: a) when the IJ
articulates an alternative and sufficient basis for her determination; b)
when her reliance on the erroneous aspect of her reasoning is substan-
tially tangential to her non-erroneous findings; or c) when overwhelm-
ing evidence in the record makes clear that the same decision is
inevitable on remand, or, in short, whenever the reviewing panel is
confident that the agency would reach the same result upon a recon-
sideration cleansed of errors.148  Thus, the court’s prior case law estab-
lished a non-exhaustive and non-exclusive list of circumstances in
which the court could decline to remand a matter to the agency for
further proceedings notwithstanding the presence of errors in the deci-
sion on review.  In Li Hua Lin, the petition was granted, as the Second
Circuit could not “be confident that the agency would reach the same
result on remand absent” the identified errors.149
Li Zu Guan, written by Calabresi as well, was issued the fol-
lowing day.150  The importance of this decision in the evolving juris-
prudence of futility lies with its statement of the interplay between the
futility of remand and the deferential compelling evidence standard of
review.  The court again noted that the operative question in deter-
mining whether remand would be futile “is whether [it] can predict the
same result in the absence of errors[.]”151  To that end, the court held
that “where errors have been found in the EOIR decision, a residue of
substantial evidence in support of the agency’s result is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for denial of review.”152  The question be-
comes not simply whether the agency decision can be supported on the
record, absent the errors, but whether the court can predict that the
agency would have reached the same conclusion in an error-free pro-
ceeding, or would reach the same conclusion on remand after the iden-
tification of the relevant errors: “to deny review in the face of EOIR
errors, a court must have confidence that an error-free proceeding
would yield the same result.  The existence of substantial evidence
supporting that result, without more, is not enough to give rise to such
confidence.”153  This assertion will be examined more closely in the
subsequent section, as it is incorrect as a matter of law, resting, as it
does, on a profound misunderstanding of the courts’ appropriate stan-
dard of review.
147 Id. at 106-07.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 111.
150 Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2006).
151 Id. at 137.
152 Id. at 137-38.
153 Id. at 138.
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Since the Li Hua Lin and Li Zu Guan decisions the Second Cir-
cuit has issued numerous other decisions addressing the futility of re-
mand, but only those which make a substantial contribution to the
evolution or understanding of that principle will be examined here.  In
Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, the Second Circuit determined that remand
was appropriate so as to allow the Board to determine, in the first in-
stance, whether or under what circumstances “affluent Guatemalans”
could constitute a particular social group under the INA.154  Despite
this disposition, the court opined that “[i]f a reviewing court can state
with assured confidence (absent agency guidance as to its pro-
tectability under the INA) that a group would or would not under any
reasonable scenario qualify as a ‘particular social group,’ it need not
remand, and may rule on the issue in the first instance.”155  This deci-
sion is distinct from those already analyzed insomuch as it sanctions
potentially deciding an issue against the government in the first in-
stance, rather than simply discerning whether the agency’s determina-
tion can otherwise be upheld notwithstanding certain errors in its
reasoning.  In Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, the court denied a petition for
review despite a lack of analysis on the part of the immigration judge
regarding whether country conditions in Albania had changed to a suf-
ficient degree to rebut a presumption of persecution, where the court
found it clear that there had been a fundamental change that would,
on any reading of the evidence, rebut the alien’s fear of persecution
and thus foreclose his ability to establish eligibility for asylum or with-
holding of removal.156  The decision in Bhanot v. Chertoff represents a
step toward greater court authority in this area, as the court consid-
ered evidence in the first instance in discerning whether remand
would be appropriate.157  The Board arguably failed to consider an af-
fidavit proffered in conjunction with the alien’s motion to reopen and
rescind an in absentia order, but the court declined to remand because
the affidavit contained only an uncorroborated statement of non-re-
ceipt of the hearing notice and contained a significant misstatement of
fact.158  In such circumstances, the court determined it was clear that
consideration of this piece of evidence would not alter the agency’s
holding.159  Finally, in Matadin v. Mukasey, the court determined that
remand would not be futile in a case where the agency misallocated
the burden of proof between the alien and the government regarding
the issue of whether the alien abandoned her lawful permanent resi-
154 Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2006).
155 Id. at 170.
156 Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2006).
157 Bhanot v. Chertoff, 474 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
158 Id. at 74.
159 Id.
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dent status.160  If the burden was correctly allocated, it was not clear,
in the court’s opinion, that the agency would reach the same conclu-
sion, i.e., that the lawful permanent resident status would be found
abandoned.161  Judge Walker concurred in the reasoning of the major-
ity and wrote separately simply to express his opinion that the case
was close but, in the final assessment, the correct allocation of the bur-
den may be determinative and result in a different outcome.162
As the foregoing review should make clear, the Second Circuit
has conceived a robust conception of its authority to address factual
and legal issues in the first instance, even without prior resolution by
the agency.  Whether this conception conflicts with Ventura’s ordinary
remand rule is an inquiry that must wait until the following section.
The remainder of the instant section is concerned with those other
courts of appeals that have held remand may be futile in certain cases.
B. Futility in Other Federal Courts of Appeals
In addition to the Second Circuit, the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have decided cases, post-
Ventura, in which the court has held remand would be futile and thus
decided a matter in the first instance.  This jurisprudence, in compari-
son with that of the Second Circuit, is nascent and confined for the
most part to solitary cases.  Nonetheless, these cases are revealing
concerning the scope and extent of the court’s authority as conceived in
the respective circuits, and may well be indicative of a broader move-
ment in these courts to develop a coherent and cohesive body of futility
precedent akin to that of the Second Circuit.
1. The First Circuit
In Sok v. Mukasey, the First Circuit hinted that remand may in
certain cases be futile, but nonetheless remanded to the agency for fur-
ther proceedings as such futility was not evident in the facts of that
case.163  An immigration judge determined that Ms. Sok could not es-
tablish her eligibility for asylum, as she failed to establish past perse-
cution in Cambodia on account of her political opinion, and any claim
of a well-founded fear of persecution was unsupported by the relevant
State Department Country Reports and undercut by the fact that her
children remained in Cambodia, unharmed.164  The First Circuit held
that the agency’s finding on the issue of past persecution was not sup-
160 Matadin v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
161 Id. at 91-93.
162 Id. at 93-95 (Walker, J., concurring).
163 Sok v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2008).
164 Id. at 51-52.
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ported by the record, and thus could not be sustained.165  Because the
past persecution determination was unsustainable, the court noted
that it would be difficult to review the agency’s determination regard-
ing the alien’s fear of future persecution, as a presumption of persecu-
tion would be warranted if the alien could establish past
persecution.166  Additionally, even if the presumption did operate in
Sok’s case, the government would have the opportunity to rebut that
presumption with evidence undercutting the claim of future
persecution.167
The First Circuit “acknowledged that there are some cases in
which the agency’s failure to properly analyze past persecution is
harmless error because the record makes it abundantly clear that the
petitioner will not likely suffer future persecution if sent back to her
home country.”168  When such circumstances are presented, the court
concluded that it could “affirm the agency’s decision despite its flaws
because the petitioner’s claim is per se destined to fail, and to remand
for further proceedings would therefore be futile.”169  Sok’s case did
not present such circumstances, however, as the Country Reports were
not unequivocal concerning the possibility of future persecution on ac-
count of her political opinion, and the fact that her children remained
in Cambodia unharmed, without additional analysis, did not necessa-
rily undercut her claim.170  As the record was not clear that Sok would
not suffer future persecution in Cambodia, making the allocation of
the burden of rebutting the presumption of a well-founded fear impor-
tant, proceedings were by necessity remanded to the Board for further
consideration of both Sok’s claim of past persecution and fear of future
persecution.171
2. The Fourth Circuit
The First Circuit’s Sok decision represents the court’s under-
standable reticence to reach a factual issue in the absence of agency
consideration of that issue in the first instance.  In Hussain v. Gonza-
les, the Fourth Circuit addressed and resolved a legal issue despite the
fact that the Board had not yet had occasion to rule on that ques-
tion.172  Hussain was ordered removed in absentia by an immigration
judge yet, over two years later, he filed a motion to reopen seeking to
165 See id. at 53-56.
166 Id. at 56 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)).
167 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) & (B)).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 56-57.
170 Id. at 57.
171 Id. at 57-58.
172 Hussain v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2007).
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rescind the in absentia order.  The immigration judge denied the mo-
tion, agreeing with the argument of DHS that the motion was un-
timely and failed to establish exceptional circumstances regarding
Hussain’s failure to appear.  Hussain appealed to the Board and, while
that appeal was pending, filed a motion to remand alleging eligibility
to adjust his status.  The Board dismissed the appeal and ostensibly
denied the motion to remand, although its language on this point was
equivocal.  Hussain filed a petition for review with the Fourth Circuit,
where he solely challenged the Board’s disposition of his motion to re-
mand proceedings.173
The Fourth Circuit held that there was no language in the
Board’s decision that could be read to have addressed or disposed of
the motion to remand, and thus that “the Board’s order neglected to
dispose” of that motion.174  Nonetheless, the court held that remand
was not necessary, despite the fact that the Board had not addressed
the motion to remand and the arguments raised therein, because Hus-
sain was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status on account of
the fact that he was not admissible to the United States—his presence
in the United States without having been admitted or paroled consti-
tuted a ground of inadmissibility disqualifying him from adjustment of
status under section 245(a) of the INA.175  Regarding the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Ventura and Thomas, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that those decisions dealt with factual issues rather than the legal
claim raised by Hussain.  According to the majority, Hussain’s legal
issue did not present circumstances where a remand would serve any
useful purpose: “Simply stated, Hussain is ineligible for the relief he
seeks because he is unable to establish a prima facie case for adjust-
ment of status.  As such, to remand this matter to the Board for fur-
ther consideration would serve no useful purpose.”176  Accordingly, the
“rare circumstances” exception was found to be applicable, especially
in light of the delay remand would entail and the inevitability of the
identical disposition of Hussain’s claim even if proceedings were
remanded.177
Judge Hamilton dissented, raising two issues connected to the
Chenery and Ventura line of cases.178  First, Judge Hamilton would
have remanded proceedings to the Board for a clarifying order ad-
dressing whether or why the Board denied the motion to remand filed
173 Id.
174 Id. at 155-56.
175 Id. at 156-57.
176 Id. at 158 (citing Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir.
2006)).
177 Id.
178 Hussain, 477 F.3d at 158-61 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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by Hussain.179  Second, remand would be necessary without a Board
decision addressing the motion to remand, as the Board is charged
with the primary responsibility of disposing of such motions.  Judge
Hamilton found the majority’s distinction between factual issues,
which would necessitate remand, and legal issues, which the Court
could conceivably address in the first instance, unavailing, as both
Ventura and Thomas raised factual and legal issues pertaining to eli-
gibility for relief under the INA.180  Likewise, whether Hussain could
establish eligibility for adjustment of status involved threshold factual
issues which the Board had not resolved, not simply legal issues re-
garding whether undisputed facts established statutory eligibility.181
Thus, for Judge Hamilton, there was “nothing in the circumstances of
[Hussain’s] case which suggest that [it] presents ‘rare circumstances’
justifying exception from the ordinary remand rule.”182
3. The Fifth Circuit
The two main cases arising out of the Fifth Circuit involve both
legal and factual questions, highlighting the broad reach the courts
have given Ventura’s “rare circumstances” exception.  In Yu Zhao v.
Gonzales, a Chinese alien applied for asylum in the United States
based on persecution and a fear of persecution attributable to his prac-
tice of Falun Gong.183  This application was denied by the agency, on
the grounds that Zhao could not establish past persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of one of the five statutorily
protected grounds.  Subsequent to the Board’s decision dismissing his
appeal, Zhao filed a motion to reconsider, seeking to introduce new
evidence of his claim, but this motion was denied.  Zhao challenged
both decisions before the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit held that the Board abused its discretion in
denying Zhao’s motion, to the extent that his motion could be con-
strued as a motion to reopen to submit new and additional evidence of
his asylum eligibility; specifically, evidence pertaining to the treat-
ment of Falun Gong practitioners in China.184  The court additionally
held that, although the Board properly determined that Zhao failed to
establish past persecution, it erred in finding that the evidence did not
support a well-founded fear of persecution.185  In making this determi-
nation, however, the court declined to reverse the well-founded fear
179 Id. at 159.
180 Id. at 160-61.
181 Id. at 161.
182 Id. (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam).
183 Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2005).
184 Id. at 304-05.
185 Id. at 307-10.
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determination and remand for further proceedings, but rather found
that the totality of the evidence compelled that determination and that
there were no discretionary grounds that would argue against a grant
of asylum.186  Thus, the court granted Zhao’s application for asylum
without offering the Board the opportunity to address his claim in
light of the additional evidence or the errors identified by the court.  It
reasoned, in so doing, that the Board had already had the opportunity
to address the asylum claim and thus that it was not usurping the
BIA’s authority to render a decision in the first instance, and that, in
any event, the language of Ventura was precatory.187  “We cautiously
conclude that this case exhibits the narrow set of circumstances that
requires no remand.”188
Judge Garza dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s asser-
tion that the case exhibited those narrow circumstances where remand
could be dispensed with under Ventura.189  Although the Board had
addressed Zhao’s asylum claim in the administrative proceedings, it
had not been afforded the opportunity to do so in light of the additional
evidence proffered with the motion to reconsider, or in light of the
identified errors in its earlier decision.190  In Judge Garza’s view, then,
the proper course would be to remand to the Board for further investi-
gation and explanation concerning the merits of Zhao’s claim.
Unlike the factual resolution at issue in Yu Zhao, the recently
decided case Dale v. Holder involved the resolution of a purely legal
question implicating state law, an area outside the Board’s recognized
expertise.191  The alien in that case was charged with being removable
as an aggravated felon convicted of a crime of violence.  He was con-
victed under N.Y. Penal Law § 120.10, pertaining to assault, yet his
conviction would only constitute an aggravated felony if his conviction
was pursuant to the first two subsections of that statute.192  After vari-
186 Id. at 310.
187 Id. at 311.
188 Id.
189 Yu Zhao, 404 F.3d at 311 (Garza, J., dissenting).
190 Id.
191 Dale v. Holder, 610 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 2010).
192 “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: 1. With intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or
to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or 2.
With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy,
amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such
injury to such person or to a third person; or 3. Under circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which cre-
ates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical
injury to another person; or 4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commis-
sion or attempted commission of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or
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ous levels of proceedings, both administrative and before the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Board determined that his conviction must have been
pursuant to one of the first two subsections of the statute, as only the
first two subsections contained the necessary mens rea requirement
that would support his plea to the “attempt” offense.193  Before the
Fifth Circuit, the government primarily argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the petition because Dale failed to administratively
exhaust his claim that New York law permitted pleas to the last two
subsections of the statute—in essence, that New York law permitted
pleas to the impossible crimes of attempted reckless and felonious as-
sault.  Nonetheless, it was additionally argued that rather than ad-
dress that issue in the first instance, if exhausted, the court should
remand to the Board to permit it the opportunity to discern whether a
plea could be pursuant to any of the four subsections, rather than
solely those two which would render Dale’s conviction an aggravated
felony.194  The court declined to remand on this basis, however, as the
relevant issue concerned New York state law, not an area where the
Board could exercise its expertise: “Although the BIA possesses exper-
tise in interpreting immigration regulations and applying those regu-
lations to the facts of an immigration case, it brings no specialized
knowledge and expertise to the issue at hand—the proper interpreta-
tion of New York criminal law.”195  Accordingly, the court addressed
the issue in the first instance, held that a plea could be pursuant to
any of the four subsections of the statute, and remanded for further
proceedings concerning the documentation that would be necessary to
establish the facts of the conviction.196
4. The Sixth Circuit
Like the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hussain, the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Karimijanaki v. Holder represents the court’s willing-
ness to resolve an unaddressed legal issue on an undisputed factual
record.197  In Karimijanaki, an immigration judge held that the peti-
tioners, a mother and her son, abandoned their lawful permanent resi-
dent status in the United States after a prolonged absence of seven
years, and that the son was not automatically entitled to U.S. citizen-
ship based on the naturalization of his father.198  The Board dismissed
another participant if there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person
other than one of the participants.” N.Y. Penal L. § 120.10.
193 Dale, 610 F.3d at 296.
194 Id. at 299.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 300-01.
197 See Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 721 (6th Cir. 2009).
198 Id. at 714.
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petitioners’ administrative appeal, but did not address the claim that
the petitioner-son acquired citizenship automatically by virtue of his
father’s naturalization.199  On petition for review to the Sixth Circuit,
the court held that the record evidence supported the agency’s finding
that the petitioner-mother abandoned her lawful permanent resident
status by her prolonged absence from the United States and the cir-
cumstances attendant upon that absence.200  The court further held, in
a matter of first impression, that the finding of intent regarding the
mother was properly imputed to the son, thus resulting in a holding
that he, too, abandoned his lawful permanent resident status.201
This left only the claim that the son automatically acquired cit-
izenship upon the naturalization of his father, a claim the Board failed
to address.202  “Generally, where an issue was ruled upon by the IJ
and properly appealed to the Board but not addressed by the Board,
the issue is not ripe for our review and should be remanded for the
Board’s consideration.”203  Citing the Second Circuit’s decision in Xiao
Ji Chen, however, the court wrote that “a remand is not required
where such a gesture would be futile.”204  Under the INA, to have ac-
quired citizenship automatically by virtue of his father’s naturaliza-
tion, the son must have been “residing in the United States in the legal
and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admis-
sion for permanent residence.”205  The immigration judge had held
that the son was not residing “in his citizen father’s physical custody
at the time of his naturalization or at any time thereafter,” and the
Sixth Circuit held that the record did not compel the contrary conclu-
sion.206  As the factual undergirding of the citizenship claim was clear,
the only issue remaining was the purely legal question of whether the
facts established circumstances that would give rise to the automatic
conferral of citizenship on the son.  The Court reached this legal issue
despite no prior Board decision, and held that the agency, i.e., the im-
migration judge, “did not err in ruling that [the son] did not acquire
citizenship because he did not reside in his citizen father’s physical
199 Id.
200 See id. at 719.
201 See id. at 719-21.
202 Id. at 721.
203 Id. (citing Matovski v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 722, 740 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted)).
204 Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 721 (6th Cir. 2009). (citing Xiao Ji Chen
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 339 (2d Cir. 2006).
205 Id. (citing INA § 320(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(3)).
206 Id.; see INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
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custody at the time of his naturalization or at any time thereafter.”207
Accordingly, the court denied the petition in its entirety.208
5. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit decision in Shou Wei Jin v. Holder returns
this review to factual findings.209  The agency denied asylum and
withholding of removal to a Chinese national and citizen who alleged
eligibility for such relief and protection based on China’s coercive fam-
ily planning policies.210  Specifically, the agency held that the alien did
not establish that he was married to his partner, who purportedly suf-
fered a forced abortion, and that he otherwise failed to establish a
well-founded fear of persecution “due to his resistance to China’s popu-
lation control policies.”211
The court held that the agency’s analysis of whether the alien
was married, whether traditionally or based on the notion of a com-
mon-law analysis, was erroneous and incorrect as a matter of law.212
Nonetheless, the court concluded that “a remand would be futile . . .
because Jin presented no evidence that he personally suffered persecu-
tion as a result of China’s population control policies.”213  Under the
governing law, an alien must establish that they themselves suffered
persecution or would suffer persecution pursuant to China’s popula-
tion control policy or for resisting its implementation, regardless of his
or her marital relationship with somebody who can establish such eli-
gibility, i.e., there is no presumption of persecution for the spouse of an
individual who has been persecuted.214  The agency noted in Jin’s case
that he did not suffer any persecution himself, nor did he ever attempt
to resist implementation of the family planning policy.215  The court
agreed: “Jin did not present any evidence that he suffered persecu-
tion—or that he will suffer persecution—as a result of any acts of re-
sistance in which he engaged.”216  This factual determination
foreclosed his eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal regard-
less of whether he was married or not, and thus his petition for review
was denied.217
207 Karimijanaki, 579 F.3d at 721-22.
208 Id.
209 See generally Shou Wei Jin v. Holder, 572 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2009).
210 Id. at 394. See INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
211 Shou Wei Jin, 572 F.3d at 394.
212 Id. at 395-96.
213 Id. at 396.
214 Id. at 396-97 (citing Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008), overruling
Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997)).
215 Id. at 397.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 398.
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6. The Ninth Circuit
Ethnic Chinese and Christians have a long and troubled his-
tory in Indonesia, and have a significant share of the asylum claims
arising in the pacific states of this country.218  Nonetheless, their
claims have enjoyed only a modicum of success as of late.  In Halim v.
Holder, the Ninth Circuit was called upon to review the agency’s de-
nial of an ethnic Chinese Christian Indonesian’s claim for asylum,
which was denied on the ground that the applicant could not credibly
establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of either religion or ethnicity.219  The court concluded that the
record did not compel a finding that the alleged past acts of harm rose
to the requisite level of severity to constitute persecution under the
INA, and that the record similarly failed to compel a finding that the
applicant possessed an objectively reasonable fear of persecution if re-
moved to Indonesia.220
On review, the petitioner alien (Halim) contended that he was
entitled to relief under the Ninth Circuit’s disfavored group analysis,
an intervening line of cases in which an applicant may establish eligi-
bility for asylum by demonstrating that he is a member of a disfavored
group and that he possesses an individualized risk of persecution on
that ground.221  As this analysis was largely an intervening develop-
ment, there was no agency decision applying this law to the facts al-
leged by Halim.  Nonetheless, the court denied that Halim presented a
legitimate claim to asylum under the court’s disfavored group ap-
proach, and thus declined to remand proceedings.222  First, although
there was certainly harassment and intimidation of ethnic Chinese
and Christians in Indonesia, the court discerned no pattern or practice
of persecution, and thus the claim that Halim belonged to a disfavored
group was weak.223  Second, despite the prevalence of such acts, the
record was clear that the government of Indonesia did not condone the
harassment and had taken remedial steps.224  Finally, Halim failed to
218 See, e.g., Lolong v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (recount-
ing this history), overruled by Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc). See also Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2004) (recount-
ing the history).
219 Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2009).
220 See id. at 975-77.
221 Id. at 975, 977-78. See Sael, 386 F.3d at 922 (establishing analysis for asylum
claims); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059-67 (9th Cir. 2009) (extending
analysis to claims for withholding of removal). See generally Lolong, 484 F.3d at
1179-81 (applying analysis).
222 Halim, 590 F.3d at 978 (Halim “failed to make the minimal showing necessary
to require that the agency reconsider its denial of relief.”).
223 Id. at 978-79.
224 Id. at 979.
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credibly establish a particularized or individualized risk of persecu-
tion, distinct from other ethnic Chinese or Christians in Indonesia, so
as to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.225
In so resolving this issue, the court was not unaware of the
general proscription of Ventura: “We recognize that given our limited
role in reviewing orders of removal, we may not decide in the first in-
stance an issue entrusted to an administrative agency.”226  The court
based its decision not to remand on three grounds:
First, we are affirming rather than reversing the agency.
Second, in the decision denying relief, the IJ recognized
that Halim was alleging a pattern of harassment and
discrimination based on his ethnicity.  Third, Halim has
not made a prima facie showing that he might be entitled
to relief under our disfavored group analysis.”227
These considerations militated against remand, and thus the court
simply denied the petition for review.228
Judge Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation,
concurred in a separate opinion.229  He noted that under other circum-
stances, the situation presented by Halim’s petition would require a
remand to the agency so that it could consider, in the first instance, his
claim under the intervening law.230  Judge Cudahy nonetheless agreed
that the petition should not be remanded on the distinct ground that
because Halim’s claim was found not credible by the agency, there was
no credible evidence to support a claim under the disfavored group
analysis and thus only one possible resolution of that issue—Halim
could not establish eligibility for asylum:231 “[w]here, as here, remand
would be futile because there is no credible evidence that could sup-
port findings that the petitioner faced an individualized risk of future
persecution, we need not remand even though more recent caselaw has
clarified the weight of pattern or practice evidence.”232
225 Id. See Lolong, 484 F.3d at 1181 (“Lolong has provided nothing that suggests
that her fears are distinct from those felt by all other ethnic Chinese Christians in
Indonesia.  Nor has she shown that all ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia
have, based on the circumstances there, a well-founded fear of persecution.  Al-
though we are sympathetic to the plight of such peoples, we understand the BIA’s
decision to preclude a general grant of asylum to Indonesian Chinese Christians,
and the record supports such a decision.”).
226 Halim, 590 F.3d at 979 (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002)).
227 Id. at 979-80.
228 Id. at 980.
229 Halim, 590 F.3d at 980 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
230 Id.
231 Id. (citing, inter alia, Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the court cannot affirm the Board on a ground it did not articulate)).
232 Id.
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In addition to Halim, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Soto-
Olarte offers an explanation of when remand may be required concern-
ing a discrete factual issue—reversal of the agency’s credibility deter-
mination.233  Soto-Olarte and his wife, both citizens of Peru, applied
for asylum in the United States based on alleged persecution at the
hands of the “Shining Path” terrorist organization.234  The immigra-
tion judge’s holding, later affirmed by the Board, denied these applica-
tions on the ground that Mr. Soto-Olarte was not credible, as there
were numerous inconsistencies between his testimony, declaration
and the relevant police report regarding the main incident of alleged
persecution.235  On petition for review, the Ninth Circuit agreed that
the noted inconsistencies were material, but held that they could not,
at that time, support the adverse credibility determination because
Soto-Olarte had offered at least one explanation for an inconsistency
which was not considered by the agency, and was otherwise not given
the opportunity to address the other areas of concern ultimately relied
upon by the immigration judge.236
Having determined that the credibility determination was not
supported by substantial evidence, the court then addressed the Ninth
Circuit’s “deemed credible” rule where, on remand, the Court had at
times “required the agency to accept the [alien’s] testimony as true”
following the reversal of an adverse credibility determination.237  The
Ninth Circuit noted that it still remanded cases with an open record
following the advent of the “deemed credible” rule, and that the cases
applying that rule did not establish a definitive or always-applicable
set of criteria for its application.238  While disclaiming any intent to do
so, the panel noted distinctions in those cases applying, and declining
to apply, the deemed credible rule.  First, “[i]f it is apparent from the
record before us that the IJ and the BIA have listed all possible rea-
sons to support an adverse credibility determination, and they are in-
adequate in law or not supported by substantial evidence, then there
may be cases where on remand we can sensibly say that a petitioner
should be deemed credible.”239  Second, “if there is a reasonable pros-
pect from the administrative record that there may be additional rea-
sons upon which the IJ or BIA could rely, then it is appropriate to
remand in a way that permits the agency to provide those reasons.”240
The Court noted the preference for erring on the side of an open re-
233 Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2009).
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 1091-92.
237 See id. at 1093.
238 Id. at 1094.
239 Id. at 1095.
240 Id.
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mand: “in any case in which there are doubts about whether there may
be other grounds for rejecting credibility, we should not restrict the
BIA or an IJ.”241  Citing to Ventura, the court remanded Soto-Olarte’s
claim on an open record without requiring that the agency deem him
credible on remand.242
Kyong Ho Shin v. Holder again highlights the interplay be-
tween the remand rule of Ventura and the deference that is normally
owed the agency’s interpretation of the statutes and regulations it is
charged with administering.243  The petitioners, a brother and sister,
obtained lawful permanent resident status through their mother who,
unbeknownst to them, obtained her “lawful” status via an immigration
broker, i.e., fraudulently.  Brother and sister Shin were charged with
removability on the grounds that they lacked a valid immigrant visa at
the time of their entry to the United States.  The agency sustained the
charge of removability and additionally denied their applications for a
waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(k) of the INA, basing that
decision on the ground that they were statutorily ineligible for such a
waiver as lacking a visa and being otherwise inadmissible.244
The Ninth Circuit upheld the agency’s determination that peti-
tioners were removable.245  It reversed the Board’s holding regarding
the waiver of inadmissibility, however, held that petitioners were stat-
utorily eligible for a waiver, and remanded solely for the adjudication
of their applications on the merits.246  In reaching this determination,
the court specifically held that to establish statutory eligibility for a
section 212(k) waiver, an alien must be inadmissible under, inter alia,
section 212(a)(7)(A)(i) of the INA, in possession of an immigrant visa,
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Kyong Ho Shin v. Holder. 607 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010).
244 Attorney General’s discretion to admit otherwise inadmissible aliens who pos-
sess immigrant visas:
Any alien, inadmissible from the United States under paragraph
(5)(A) or (7)(A)(i) of subsection (a) of this section, who is in pos-
session of an immigrant visa may, if otherwise admissible, be ad-
mitted in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney
General is satisfied that inadmissibility was not known to, and
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence by, the immigrant before the time of departure of the ves-
sel or aircraft from the last port outside the United States and
outside foreign contiguous territory or, in the case of an immi-
grant coming from foreign contiguous territory, before the time of
the immigrant’s application for admission.
INA § 212(k), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k).
245 Kyong Ho Shin, 607 F.3d at 1216-18.
246 Id. at 1218-21.
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whether valid or not, and be otherwise admissible except for the
ground of inadmissibility under the first prong of the statutory re-
quirements.247  On the court’s review of the facts, petitioners could
meet these requirements, and there was otherwise no basis for con-
cluding, as had the Board, that the statute required a valid immigrant
visa in order to establish statutory eligibility for the waiver.248  The
court then remanded solely for adjudication of the application, citing to
Ventura for the proposition that the court could not issue a decision on
that application in the first instance.249
Judge Wallace dissented from the majority’s opinion on two
grounds.250  First, Judge Wallace disagreed with the court’s interpre-
tation of the requirements for obtaining a waiver of inadmissibility
under section 212(k), and cited evidence to the effect that the analysis
and interpretation of the Board, rather than the court, was correct.251
Second, the first point aside, if there was disagreement with the
Board’s interpretation in its decision in the Shins’ case, the proper
route was to remand to the Board to allow it to render a definitive and
precedential opinion, in line with both Ventura and Chevron, in the
first instance, rather than to dictate to the Board what the statute re-
quired and remand only for adjudication.252
7. The Eleventh Circuit
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Calle v. U.S. Attor-
ney General provides the cap to that line of cases where the courts of
appeals have reached out to resolve a legal issue without prior Board
resolution.253  Ms. Calle, a native and citizen of Colombia, began her
long administrative odyssey by applying for asylum, withholding of re-
moval, and protection under CAT before an immigration judge.  Her
claim, based on a fear of persecution at the hands of the FARC, was
rejected by both the immigration judge and, on appeal the Board. The
asylum application was rejected on grounds of timeliness, and the re-
maining applications on their merits.  Ms. Calle filed a motion to re-
consider its decision with the Board, but this motion was denied.
Persevering, she nevertheless filed a subsequent motion to reopen, ar-
guing that country conditions had deteriorated in Colombia such that
she would be targeted by the FARC if removed.  The Board denied this
motion, holding that she failed to establish her prima facie eligibility
247 Id. at 1219.
248 Id. at 1219-20.
249 See id. at 1221 (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002)).
250 Kyong Ho Shin, 607 F.3d at 1221-25 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 1221-23.
252 Id. at 1224-25.
253 Calle v. U.S. Attorney General, 504 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).
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for the relief sought.  Petitioner again moved for reconsideration of the
Board’s decision, but the BIA denied this motion as numerically barred
under the statute and regulation.
On petition for review, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Board erred in deeming the motion number-barred, as the regulations
specify only that an alien is limited to one motion to reconsider a spe-
cific decision, not simply one motion to reconsider for the duration of
any proceedings against her.254  Since the second motion to reconsider
sought reconsideration of a decision distinct from Ms. Calle’s appeal, it
was more accurately characterized as her first motion to reconsider
that decision, and thus not number-barred.255  The court then noted
that the Board had not addressed the merits of the motion to recon-
sider, having denied the motion solely on number-barred grounds, and
that the appropriate course at that stage would normally be to remand
to the agency for further proceedings.256  The court declined to re-
mand, however, holding that Calle’s case fit within the “rare circum-
stances” exception of Ventura, as the unresolved issue in her case was
legal and procedural rather than factual.257  The issue was whether
there were grounds on which the motion to reconsider could be
granted, and according to the court, that is an “objective, procedural
inquiry; she either specified errors and supported them with pertinent
authority, or she did not.  Thus, in these ‘rare circumstances’ we feel
comfortable deciding the issue left unresolved by the BIA in the first
instance.”258  The court went on to hold that Calle’s motion failed to
adequately specify any errors of fact or law in the Board’s decision de-
nying her motion to reopen, and thus denied her petition for review on
the merits, dispensing with remand.259
IV. IS THE EVOLVING FUTILITY JURISPRUDENCE IN
TENSION WITH, OR COMPLEMENTARY TO, THE
ORDINARY REMAND RULE?
As a realistic matter, the federal courts of appeals are the last
stop for a litigant.260  Thus, their implementation of the Supreme
254 Id. at 1329; see INA § 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).
255 Calle, 504 F.3d at 1328-29.
256 Id. at 1329 (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002).
257 Id. at 1330.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 1331.
260 See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2009 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
2 (2009) (In 2009 57,740 cases were filed in the federal courts of appeals, while the
Supreme Court issued 74 signed opinions out of 1,596 cases docketed.); see also
David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, The Rule of Four, The Cert. Pool, and the Supreme
Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997); Kenneth W. Starr,
The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft,
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Court’s dictates is of the utmost importance to a fully and fairly func-
tioning judicial and administrative state.  In the context of administra-
tive law, this means that despite more or less clear directives from the
Supreme Court regarding when matters must be returned to the
agency for further proceedings, the discretion of the circuit courts to
retain and decide matters in the first instance is great and largely un-
reviewable.  This being said, is the post-Ventura futility jurisprudence
in tension with the ordinary remand rule of Ventura?  Or is it simply a
concrete manifestation of Ventura’s own recognition that there will be
“rare circumstances” in which remand is not required?  This question
will have no clear resolution in this article, and, to echo Judge
Friendly’s dismay, it is unlikely that there is any bright shaft of light
that would identify a clear means of decision in each and every case.
Nonetheless, the consistency of the rationales of the circuit courts with
Ventura can be judged within the broad scope of that decision, and a
clearer path for future decisions can then be charted.  Before any of
that becomes “necessary,” however, a threshold question must be an-
swered: do these new futility cases in any meaningful way implicate
the court’s remand authority?
A. Errors, Substantial Evidence, and the Possibility of Remand
The cases addressed in Section III are explicitly couched in
terms of the “futility of remand,” making clear that, at the very least,
the courts themselves believe that the issues raised and addressed im-
plicate their authority to either remand or, in rare circumstances, to
resolve an issue in the first instance without further agency involve-
ment.  Are the courts accurate in this characterization?  The short an-
swer is, only partially—a great number of these cases do not confront
circumstances which would place the court in a Ventura-type situa-
tion, and this is especially true in the context of petitions raising ad-
verse credibility issues.  To understand why, it is necessary to
understand the extremely deferential standard of review that the
courts of appeals must utilize in addressing the Board’s factual find-
ings, including its eligibility determinations for asylum and withhold-
ing of removal.
Pursuant to section 242(b)(4)(B) of the INA, “the administra-
tive findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”261  On review before
the courts of appeals, the burden is not on the government to establish
that the administrative findings are supported by the record evidence,
but rather on the petitioner-alien to establish that the record compels
90 MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2006) (noting quantitative decline in Supreme Court’s
docket).
261 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
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the conclusion he would have the court make.  To carry this burden,
the petitioner-alien must point to record evidence that “ ‘not only sup-
ports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it.’ ”262  As long as the
record evidence does not compel the conclusion contrary to that
reached by the agency, there will be no grounds for granting the peti-
tion for review when the issues are fact dependent rather than legal.
Accordingly, to the extent that the futility cases involve ad-
dressing factual issues on review, i.e., credibility determinations, eligi-
bility determinations regarding asylum and withholding of removal,
etc., the cases simply boil down to application of the INA’s deferential
standard of review to the facts of the particular cases, and thus do not
in reality implicate any questions pertaining to remand or the futility
of remand.  First, regarding those cases where the court denies the
petition despite the presence of errors in the underlying factual deter-
mination, all that is happening is the court’s recognition of the fact
that, even in light of the errors, the petitioner cannot establish that
the record compels the conclusion contrary to that made by the
agency.263  Remand as a live issue never comes into play because a
circumstance that may require remand never arises—in failing to
carry his burden in establishing that the record compels any reasona-
ble adjudicator to accept his version of the facts, the petitioner neces-
sarily fails to establish any basis on which the petition could be
granted.  Second, as a necessary corollary to this point, the courts’ re-
mand authority is not implicated when the court determines that the
record does compel the contrary conclusion, thereby resolving the cred-
ibility issue or other factual controversy.  As the Seventh Circuit noted
in granting rehearing in Ghebremedhin, when the court applies the
appropriate standard of review and finds that the agency erred, that
determination “in no way disregards the agency’s expertise and role as
front-line evaluator of evidence.”264  Rather, the appellate resolution of
the issue is consistent with the governing principles of administrative
law, and the subsequent limited remand for further proceedings in
light of the court’s resolution of the factual issue, e.g., to permit the
Attorney General an opportunity to exercise his discretion in granting
or denying relief, does not implicate the court’s general authority to
262 Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Klawitter v. INS, 970
F.2d 149, 151-52 (6th Cir. 1992)).
263 See, e.g., Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 339 (2d Cir. 2006)
(declining to remand where evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility
determination notwithstanding certain errors); Qyteza v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 224,
228 (2006) (finding errors in the denial of an asylum application but declining re-
mand where it was clear the same decision would be reached absent the errors);
Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 401 (2006) (adverse credibility determination sus-
tained despite errors in the agency’s consideration of that issue).
264 Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004).
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remand once an error has been discerned or, in the appropriate cir-
cumstances, to hold and decide the issue in the first instance.
What, then, to make of Judge Calabresi’s statement in Li Zu
Guan that “to deny review in the face of EOIR errors, a court must
have confidence that an error-free proceeding would yield the same re-
sult.  The existence of substantial evidence supporting that result,
without more, is not enough to give rise to such confidence.”265  This
statement is not correct for at least two reasons.  First, it disregards
the fact that it is the petitioner’s burden to establish that the evidence
compels the conclusion he argues the agency should have reached, not
the government’s burden to establish that the agency’s findings are
sufficiently supported by the record.  As the burden is on the peti-
tioner, if he cannot establish that the record as a whole compels the
conclusion he advances, then it is irrelevant if there are some errors in
the record—the only consideration is whether the record taken as a
whole compels or fails to compel the relevant conclusion.  Second, Cal-
abresi’s construction seemingly establishes a second test for reviewing
agency factual determinations.  Not only must the courts consider
whether the record compels the contrary conclusion, but if there are
some errors present, the record must fail to compel the contrary con-
clusion and the court must satisfy itself that the agency would have
reached the same conclusion notwithstanding the purported errors.
There is no textual support in the INA for such an approach, and it is,
at bottom, a bizarre construction as the very fact that the record does
not compel the contrary conclusion, notwithstanding the errors, would
seem to be definitive regarding whether the agency would have
reached a different conclusion absent the identified errors.  Accord-
ingly, contrary to the opinion of Judge Calabresi, if the record fails to
compel the contrary conclusion regarding the factual issue in dispute,
that is a sufficient condition on which to deny the petition rendering
any recourse to “remand” language inapposite.266
Another situation where the courts’ authority to remand cases
is not seriously in play arises when there is a sufficient and indepen-
dently dispositive basis on which to deny the petition, notwithstanding
material errors in another aspect of the decision.  As the Supreme
Court has noted, “[a]s a general rule courts and agencies are not re-
quired to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary
to the results they reach.”267  Such a situation was presented to the
265 Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2006). .
266 But see id. at 137-38.(“Where errors have been found in the EOIR decision, a
residue of substantial evidence in support of the agency’s result is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for denial of review.”).
267 INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1976), (citing, inter alia, Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) (“Since the sentences of three months each
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Seventh Circuit in Shou Wei Jin.268  There, despite errors in the
agency’s consideration of the alien’s marriage, the governing law made
clear that both a spouse and an unmarried partner would have to
make the identical showings in order to establish eligibility for asylum
under section 101(a)(42)(B) of the INA.  Accordingly, although deter-
mining that the agency’s marriage rationale was erroneous, the peti-
tion could nevertheless be denied on the dispositive basis that even if
married, Jin failed to establish his eligibility for asylum.  Likewise, in
the Halim case, Judge Cudahy, concurring, would have based his deci-
sion to decline remand on the ground that the alien was found not
credible in the underlying proceedings, and thus that finding infected
the whole of any potential claim he could make.  Instead of reaching
out to address the issue of prima facie eligibility, the record evidence
supported declining remand on the dispositive basis that the credibil-
ity determination foreclosed any avenues for relief or protection under
the INA.
One final group of cases bears mentioning in this context—
those cases in which the Board would not have jurisdiction to address
the issue if presented to it in the first instance, or where the Board
lacks the relevant expertise under its mandate to give its decision def-
erential effect in the courts of appeals.  The first situation is exclu-
sively confined to constitutional challenges to the statute and
regulations, which the Board lacks jurisdiction to address.269  In those
circumstances, then, a court’s remand authority is not implicated in
addressing a constitutional claim in the first instance, as the court is
the only appropriate venue for such a claim.  The second situation re-
flects the fact that the Board will often have to address matters outside
its own institutional purview in order to reach a decision regarding
statutory or regulatory interpretation within its purview.  The Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Dale, declining remand on the ground that the
agency’s interpretation of state criminal law is not entitled to any def-
erence, highlights this distinction.  If the agency cannot bring its ex-
pertise to bear on a given issue on remand, then there are no
compelling justifications for remand and against judicial resolution of
the issue in the first instance.
So a great number of the cases advancing futility claims can be
reconciled with Ventura on the ground that they do not really impli-
imposed by the district court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently,
it will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if
we find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the curfew order,
must be sustained.”)).
268 See supra Part III.B.5.
269 See, e.g., Severino v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that ex-
haustion requirements do not apply to claims over which the Board lacks jurisdic-
tion); Zeqiri v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 364, 370 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
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cate the courts’ authority to remand or reach an issue in the first in-
stance.  This sampling of cases is not, however, exhaustive of the
emerging futility jurisprudence.  The Sixth Circuit in Karimijanaki
clearly reached an issue not addressed by the Board in a situation
where there should have been at least a presumption of remand.  Like-
wise, the Ninth Circuit’s Halim decision embraces a rather expansive
role for the court in determining an alien’s eligibility for relief pursu-
ant to intervening case law, notwithstanding the fact that the agency
did not and could not have resolved the relevant issue first, adminis-
tratively.  Finally, the Second Circuit’s decision in Ucelo-Gomez seems
to extend the court’s authority to its apogee, as its determination that
it could, in certain circumstances, decide whether facts established a
particular social group under the INA is a blatant encroachment on
the agency’s primacy in interpreting the INA.  Thus, Ventura and the
ordinary remand rule are clearly implicated by this evolving jurispru-
dence.  The purpose of the following section is to discern whether this
jurisprudence represents a permissible construction of the courts’ au-
thority vis-a`-vis the primacy of the agency, or whether the courts have
overstepped the legitimate bounds of their reviewing function.
B. Futility vs. Remand
The prism through which this section must proceed is Ven-
tura’s own recognition, consistent with general administrative law
principles, that there will be rare circumstances in which the courts of
appeals may dispense with remand and resolve an issue in the first
instance.270  The “ordinary remand rule” acts as a strong presumption
in favor of administrative primacy in resolving issues within the
agency’s competence, but that presumption, as noted by the Supreme
Court and the various courts of appeals, may be rebutted when certain
circumstances are present.  Those circumstances were traced earlier in
this article,271 and it must be assumed that any exception to the ordi-
nary remand rule will broadly mirror those prior decisions.272  None-
theless, before proceeding, it is also worth noting that simply because
a court concludes it may decide an issue without remand does not
mean it must do so.  It is a decision that is left to the court’s discretion
once a “rare circumstance” is presented, and there are strong ratio-
nales for remanding proceedings even in such circumstances.  As
Judge Friendly wrote,
270 INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,
470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
271 See supra Section I.A.
272 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969);  George
Hyman Const. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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[I]f the courts suspect that an agency is not truly carry-
ing out the purpose of a statute, no matter what its pro-
fessions, reversals for inadequate or erroneous
subsidiary findings will require the agency to rethink the
problem and, if it adheres to the previous decision, to
state its position in a manner that may provoke a ruling
on an issue of law.273
In those situations, remand may be more beneficial to the litigants and
the system in general, notwithstanding the courts’ conceded authority
to dispense with remand.
Remand may be dispensed with under Ventura’s “rare circum-
stances” exception where the court determines that, on a clear factual
record, “only one disposition is possible as a matter of law.”274  The
Sixth Circuit’s Karimijanaki decision is the clearest exemplar of this
class of case in the current review.  The court determined that no rea-
sonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary of
the agency’s factual findings, leaving only the legal issue of whether
the facts alleged established the son’s entitlement to citizenship.  The
Board did not address this issue, but the court dispensed with remand
on the argument that, pursuant to the agency’s determination of the
facts, the son was necessarily foreclosed from establishing citizenship,
i.e., there was only one permissible legal resolution of the relevant is-
sue.  Decisions such as the Karimijanaki case do not impermissibly
encroach on agency prerogatives.  The agency’s primacy in factfinding
was clearly recognized and safeguarded by the court’s decision, as the
ultimate legal conclusion was based on the facts as found by the
agency.  Moreover, the immigration judge had already reached the
same conclusion; it was only the Board that had not explicitly ad-
dressed the citizenship claim.
In other circumstances, however, especially in situations where
the factual record is not as clear, the court has reversed certain find-
ings of fact, or it is apparent that no administrative adjudicator has
considered the issue, the presumption of remand should probably oper-
ate unrebutted.  A remand would less obviously be futile, and the court
would run a greater risk of trammeling on the factfinding mission of
the agency.  Unfortunately, and again, the dividing line here is subjec-
tive and the ultimate decision on review necessarily discretionary.
This is perhaps best illustrated by the divided panel of the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Hussain, where the majority believed it was solely addressing
the legal issue of eligibility for adjustment of status, while Judge Ham-
ilton believed any resolution of that issue involved both fact-finding
and questions of law.  In such cases where the dividing line between a
273 Friendly, supra note 3, at 224.
274 George Hyman Constr. Co., 963 F.2d at 1539.
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legal question and a factual question blurs, or where the resolution of
a legal question will necessarily involve fact-finding not previously un-
dertaken by the agency, proceedings should be remanded.  Addition-
ally, if the agency has not been afforded the opportunity to exercise its
authority to render a precedential decision on an issue of statutory in-
terpretation, remand should be undertaken to allow it that opportu-
nity.  In Shin, the Ninth Circuit erred in this regard by rendering an
interpretation of a statutory provision without permitting the Board
the opportunity to address the issue on remand.  In his dissent, Judge
Wallace noted that this deprived the Board of the chance to bring its
expertise to bear on the issue and render a decision entitled to sub-
stantial deference on review before the courts of appeals.  Although
erroneous, the Ninth Circuit’s decision does not represent a definitive
encroachment on administrative competence, as the Board has the
prerogative to render a contrary and precedential opinion on remand
under the Supreme Court’s dictate in Brand X.  Nonetheless, courts
should be wary of rendering statutory interpretations of the INA with-
out a prior precedential resolution by the Board.
In any event, a court should be wary of reaching too far to re-
solve a “legal issue,” paying close heed to the territory it must traverse
to eventually reach that issue.  The more resolution of the legal issue
is tied to compelling administrative factual findings, accepted by the
court on review, the more likely it is that remand could be safely dis-
pensed with.  The heavier the court’s hand is in assessing, reversing,
or questioning the administrative findings of fact, the less it should
feel confident in resolving the issue, even if legal in nature, in the first
instance.
Outside the context of purely legal issues, when may the court
dispense with remand and resolve a fundamentally factual question in
the first instance?  This issue is posed clearly by the Ninth Circuit’s
decisions in Halim and Soto-Olarte, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Zhao, and the Second Circuit’s decision in Ucelo-Gomez.  The short an-
swer is: never.  The courts of appeals should never reach out to decide
a factual issue unaddressed by the agency or which, when cleansed of
its errors, could admit of multiple permissible answers.275
Before giving a longer answer to this question, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s justifications for dispensing with remand warrant consideration.
In Halim, the court did not simply decide the relevant issue and thus
deny the petition—it recognized that the arguments raised by the peti-
275 Again, when the record fails to compel a conclusion, or does compel a conclu-
sion, the courts’ decision is not implicating its remand authority.  That is not the
circumstance presented here.  Here, the issue concerns factual issues unaddressed
or erroneously addressed by the agency which make the very application of the
compelling evidence standard impossible.
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tioner necessitated consideration of whether remand would be the ap-
propriate course of action.276  It ultimately declined remand on three
bases: first, because it was ultimately affirming rather than reversing
the decision of the Board; second, because the agency considered a
functionally similar claim in the course of denying the underlying ap-
plication for asylum; and third, because the petitioner did not estab-
lish prima facie eligibility for relief pursuant to the relevant
analysis.277  These rationales are unconvincing and fail to establish
that the court acted within the permissible bounds of its authority in
denying the petition rather than remanding for further proceedings.
The court’s first reason, that it may decide an issue not ad-
dressed by the agency simply because by so deciding it has the effect of
denying the petition, is not colorable.  In Chenery, the Supreme Court
was clear that remand should not be dispensed with simply because by
doing so the agency action at issue would be left standing: “For pur-
poses of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court
cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively en-
trusted to an administrative agency.”278  Moreover, the court’s con-
struction of its authority in this context runs afoul of the general
proscription that a court cannot affirm an agency decision on a ground
that the agency did not articulate.  Here again Chenery is instructive:
“We . . . hold that an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the
grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were
those upon which its action can be sustained.”279  The long-standing
practice of the Ninth Circuit is consistent with this formulation,280 al-
though it should be clear that Halim runs counter to this rule—at
least one ground on which the petition was denied was not addressed
by the agency.  Finally, this reasoning by the court misapprehends the
animating motive behind the ordinary remand rule.  There is a pre-
sumption of remand not to safeguard a decisional outcome, but to safe-
guard the administrative decision making process itself.281  The
ordinary remand rule exists to vouchsafe the agency’s primacy in con-
ducting the appropriate fact-finding and applying the law to those
276 Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2009).
277 See id.
278 SEC v. Cenery, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
279 Id. at 95.
280 See, e.g., Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1985). (“[T]he BIA’s denial
of relief can be affirmed only on the basis articulated in the decision, and we can-
not assume that the BIA considered factors that it failed to mention in its deci-
sion.”) (internal citations omitted).
281 Cf. Friendly, supra note 3, at 224 (“Refusal to reverse on the basis of a judicial
belief that the agency is certain to come to the same conclusion is rarely objection-
able to the agency, however painful it may be to a litigant who would profit by the
delay incident to even a fruitless remand.”).
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facts, not to protect a substantive outcome that is favorable to the gov-
ernment, of which the agency is but a part.  To say that remand is less
important because the effect of the courts declination is to leave an
agency decision standing misses the point.  In those circumstances, no
less than in those where the court determines that the agency action
cannot stand, remand is necessary to permit the agency the opportu-
nity to undertake the relevant inquiry and investigation in the first
instance, freed of any prior errors or, as in Halim, apprised of the need
to apply intervening law to previously found facts.
The court’s second stated justification is more convincing, but
only superficially.  This contention is at bottom the assertion that be-
cause the agency disposed of a claim similar to that which could be
brought pursuant to its intervening “disfavored group analysis,” the
factual record was relatively complete, and the prior legal disposition
of the application sufficiently analogous, so that the court could pro-
ceed to resolution of the new issue without the need for further agency
proceedings.  Yet the determination of whether an applicant can estab-
lish eligibility for asylum is a factual question statutorily committed to
the Attorney General and his delegates.  Even if no new additional
facts would be adduced, and even if the agency had disposed of a simi-
lar claim in denying relief initially, the Board enjoys primacy in mak-
ing the determination of eligibility.  The status of the record on review
and the nature of any legal issues previously resolved do not alter this
division of authority.  The Ninth Circuit’s contention to the contrary
was erroneous.
Its final justification, that the petitioner failed to establish
prima facie eligibility for relief pursuant to its disfavored group analy-
sis, reads like an implicit concession that the court overstepped the
permissible bounds of its authority.  The issue of prima facie eligibility
for relief is the archetype of a determination that the agency must
make in the first instance before a reviewing court may address the
issue.  This is all the more true in the context of asylum under the
INA, where the statute unequivocally places responsibility for making
such determinations in the hands of the Attorney General and his del-
egates.282  The court’s determination that the petitioner failed to es-
tablish prima facie eligibility does not act as a justification for
declining remand, but is, rather, the clearest statement of what is
wrong with the Halim decision and how clearly the court encroached
on the primacy of the agency.
If the Ninth Circuit failed in justifying its decision not to re-
mand in Halim, are there, nevertheless, legitimate bases on which the
courts of appeals could reach a factual issue in the first instance?
Again, and to return to the brief answer offered previously, there are
282 See INA § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).
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no readily conceivable circumstances where the court should decide a
factual question without prior administrative resolution.  Although
the Second Circuit has noted in dicta that it could reach and decide a
factual issue not addressed by the agency, it offered no citation or rea-
soned support for this bald proposition.283  The Ninth Circuit’s
“deemed credible” rule is equally lacking in any legal support, as it
explicitly arrogates the agency’s authority to weigh the credibility of
applicants, and has, for good reason, been rejected by every other court
of appeals.  Most importantly in this context, it is not the domain of a
reviewing court to address or resolve factual issues, whether that re-
view is of agency action or an appeal from a district court.  It is not
sufficient to be able to “state with assured confidence” that a factual
issue should be resolved in x manner,284 as no matter how confident
the court is in its resolution of the issue, the very act of reaching and
resolving the issue is an encroachment on agency primacy.  Thus, the
situation presented by an unresolved factual question in the courts of
appeals most closely approximates the absolutist tenor of Chenery,285
and it is in such circumstances where the courts should be loathe to
take any action save remand.
The only potential scenario where the court could be excused in
“overreaching” is, ironically, exactly that which the Halim decision
presented and on which Judge Cudahy based his concurrence in the
declination to remand.  Judge Cudahy resolved the factual issue of eli-
gibility in the first instance, but he did so on grounds already consid-
ered by the agency and which could be deemed dispositive of the
disfavored group claim without the need to address the merits of that
claim.  By basing his concurrence on credibility, Judge Cudahy was
acting within the permissible bounds of a reviewing court, even as he
reached out to decide an issue not considered by the Board.  These cir-
cumstances will be rare, being present only where the resolution of an
administratively unresolved factual question can be disposed of simply
283 See Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2006) (“If a reviewing
court can state with assured confidence (absent agency guidance as to its pro-
tectability under the INA) that a group would or would not under any reasonable
scenario qualify as a ‘particular social group,’ it need not remand, and may rule on
the issue in the first instance.”).
284 See id. See also Guendelsberger, supra note 106, at 636 (“Even if the court
regards the evidence of record as so one-sided as to make the result on remand a
foregone conclusion, the court should remand to the agency rather than evaluate
whether reasonable factfinders could reach different conclusions based on the
evidence.”).
285 See SEC v. Cenery, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (“If an order is valid only as a deter-
mination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and
which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an
administrative judgment.”).
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on application of an administratively resolved factual question.  The
role of fact-finder is one that the administrative agency is peculiarly
well-suited to, especially in comparison to an appellate court whose
central function is ensuring that the law is correctly discerned and ap-
plied.  The agency also has specialized expertise in the matters within
its purview, as well as institutional knowledge and memory.286  As the
Supreme Court held in 1952,
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business
entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the
limited functions of review by the judiciary are more ra-
tionally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining
and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal is-
sues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by
specialization, by insight gained through experience, and
by more flexible procedure.287
In light of the purposes for which administrative agencies were
instituted, it will be a rare day indeed when a court can make a colora-
ble claim that remand is not necessary for agency disposition of a fac-
tual issue.
* * *
Where do these ruminations leave the courts of appeals?  While
there is no clear-cut answer that can be applied generally across the
range of immigration cases, a guiding schematic can be discerned in
the preceding.
First, there will be a presumption of remand in situations
where the administrative agency has not yet addressed the relevant
issue, or where the agency order does not clearly indicate the basis of
its decision, or where the court has identified legal or factual errors in
the decision on review.  The issue of remand will not be implicated,
however, in circumstances where, notwithstanding certain factual er-
rors, the court determines that the record compels or fails to compel
the conclusion advanced by the petitioners.  In those cases, the court
need only apply the compelling evidence standard to the facts, and re-
solve the issue via the appropriate standard of review.  Likewise, the
286 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (“[The
NLRB is] one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to
deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry
the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must
respect.”); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (same,
regarding the FCC’s handling of matters involving communications); Atl. Coast
Line R.R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 317 (1935) (same, regarding ICC’s expertise
in railroads).
287 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
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issue of remand will not be implicated if there is an independent and
dispositive basis on which the court can deny the petition, notwith-
standing errors in a different aspect of the agency’s decision.  Finally,
remand is not at issue when the court confronts an issue in the first
instance that would be outside the jurisdiction of the Board, or where
the Board’s expertise is not directly implicated by resolution of the
issue.
Once the court apprehends that the petition presents an issue
implicating its remand authority, it must categorize the issue raised,
i.e., whether it is a legal or factual issue.  If the issue is factual, the
presumption of remand should be non-rebuttable, as the primacy of
the agency is at its nadir in such circumstances.  There are no colora-
ble situations that would permit the court to decide a factual issue in
the first instance, without prior resolution by the agency.  Addition-
ally, the court’s “certainty” regarding the disposition of the issue can-
not and should not operate to rebut the presumption of remand, as the
presumption exists in large part to safeguard the primacy of the
agency’s factfinding.  The only potential exception to this rule would be
the situation presented in Halim, whereby the court can deny relief on
the newly raised issue on the basis of a controlling finding already is-
sued by the Board and upheld by the court.
On the other hand, if the issue is purely legal, the presumption
of remand is rebuttable, but only on a heightened demonstration that
remand would be futile.  The court should assure itself that not only
would the agency only be able to reach one decision on remand, but
that there are compelling reasons outside the contention of futility
that justify abrogating the agency’s primary role.  Such reasons may
be akin to those presented in Karimijanaki, where the court decided
the legal issue on a clear factual record and its resolution was consis-
tent with at least one agency adjudicator.  Situations where substan-
tial harm to the litigants may arise on account of the delay inherent in
even a futile remand may present similarly compelling reasons.  In
whatever circumstances are presented, however, the court should not
rely simply on assertions of “futility” in reaching the legal determina-
tion absent prior administrative resolution.  To paraphrase Judge Cal-
abresi, futility is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for denying
remand.288  In order to adequately safeguard the prerogatives of the
agency, and to ensure that the courts of appeals maintain the limits of
their own authority, remand must be the prescribed course of action in
all but the most extraordinary circumstances.
288 See Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2006).
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CONCLUSION
Over six decades have passed since Chenery, and nearly a dec-
ade since the ordinary remand rule was enunciated in Ventura.  None-
theless, deciding when to remand and when to hold a case is as much
“art” today as it was when Judge Friendly published his review of the
law in 1969.  The dividing line may be apparent only as a matter of
concrete impression, i.e., the courts will know it when they see it,289
and will be conscious of any appellate encroachment on administrative
function.  A transgression may only be realized in the rare circum-
stance of admonishment by the Supreme Court.
Despite the inherent discretionary and subjective nature of the
remand determination, one clear line within the broader rules deduced
here may be relevant and meaningful as a guide: common sense with
adequate recognition of the interdependencies between the adminis-
trative state and the judiciary.  Such was Judge Friendly’s prescrip-
tion: “[W]hile judges must be respectful of the policy-making and fact-
finding functions of the agencies, they need not—indeed, should not—
regard themselves and the agencies as working in completely water-
tight compartments. . . .  [W]hen sensibly applied [Chenery] and its
related principles continue to be vital and useful doctrines of adminis-
trative law.”290  A common-sense approach to remands would embody
a robust conception of administrative primacy and judicial recognition
that only in the rarest circumstances should an issue be reached and
decided on review without prior agency resolution.  This approach
should also recognize that even in those rare circumstances where re-
mand could be dispensed with, it should not be, unless there are com-
pelling considerations which operate to negate the agency’s primary
role in interpreting and deciding issues pursuant to the statutes and
regulations within its mandate.  These guiding principles walk a nar-
row line of reconciliation between Friendly’s purists and realists and,
if sensibly applied by the courts of appeals, Chenery and Ventura will
remain “vital and useful doctrines of administrative law” for the fore-
seeable future.291
289 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of materials I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it. . . .”).
290 Friendly, supra note 3, at 225.
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